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Cloud computing has become one of the most promising technologies for the future of IT 
industry due to its benefits for business. Many organizations are willing to employ this 
technology for hosting their services in order to achieve economies of scale, reduce 
spending on technology infrastructure, streamline processes, reduce capital costs, 
improve the performance, availability, accessibility, and flexibility. However, the level of 
security provided by a cloud computing service model has been specified as the biggest 
challenge facing the cloud services providers and a major concern for the cloud services 
customers. Cloud computing has attractive features such as elasticity, auto scaling, and 
utility computing. These features could help the adopters to minimize their operating 
costs and maximize resource utilization. However, if the attackers take the advantage of 
these features and launch a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack on the cloud 
computing resources, DDoS attack will be diverted to a new strain of attack called 
Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS) attack. An EDoS attack occurs when attack 
machines send a huge amount of service requests to the cloud computing servers, 
exploiting the elasticity and auto scaling features of the cloud, to charge a cloud adopter’s 
bill an exorbitant extra amount of costs due to the pay per use model of the cloud, leading 
to large scale service withdraw or bankruptcy. 
xx 
 
In this work, we study several existing mitigation techniques for the EDoS attack and 
state their major drawbacks. Then, a new reactive approach, implemented at the cloud 
provider’s end, is proposed to mitigate such attacks taking into account most of the 
drawbacks of the existing mitigation techniques. Through the proposed technique, limited 
access permission for cloud services is granted to each user based on different factors 
such as Graphics Turing Test (GTT), Uniform Resource Locator (URL) redirection 
technique, Trust Factor (TF), and Maximum Requests Per Second (MRPS). Initially, the 
proposed technique will monitor the auto scaling feature and the auto scaling thresholds 
to detect if there is an EDoS attack. Once an attack behavior is detected, the cloud service 
will trigger a checking component for differentiating between legitimate users and 
automated attackers (Zombies). Subsequently, the traffic or requests generated by an 
automated attacker will be dropped while the legitimate users’ requests will be directed to 
the cloud servers. The proposed approach has the ability to identify the legitimacy of 
clients behind a Network Address Translation (NAT) router and avoid blocking an entire 
NAT-based network that may hosts legitimate clients from accessing the cloud servers. 
The effectiveness of the proposed mitigation technique is evaluated using CloudSim 
simulator. In addition, we conduct a comparison between our new approach and the 
EDoS-Shield technique. The simulation results show that the proposed technique 
successfully differentiates the legitimate and attacker clients. Moreover, the proposed 
technique outperforms the existing techniques especially when those clients belong to the 
same NAT-based network. In addition, the results show that the EDoS attacks will not 
force auto scaling of the cloud service when implementing the proposed technique at the 
cloud service provider end. 
 ixx
 
 ملخص الرسالة
 
 
 ابراهيم شواهنة أحمد : الاسم الكامل
   
يف هجمات الدفاع ضد هجمات الحرمان الاقتصادي للاستدامة: تقنية محسنة لتخف قوقعة : عنوان الرسالة
لتحكم في الوصول إلى موارد واالاقتصادي للاستدامة في الحوسبة السحابية الحرمان 
 سحابةال
   
 هندسة الحاسوب : التخصص
   
 6102 ، أبريل : تاريخ الدرجة العلمية
 
الجمة لفوائدها  واحدة من التقنيات الواعدة لمستقبل صناعة تكنولوجيا المعلومات نظرا  هي الحوسبة السحابية 
تخفيض تكاليف العديد من المنظمات لتوظيف هذه التكنولوجيا لاستضافة خدماتها من أجل تتجه للأعمال التجارية. 
 ، ، وخفض تكاليف رأس المال ، وتبسيط العمليات لتكنولوجيال، والحد من الإنفاق على البنية التحتية  التوسع
مستوى الأمن  مع ذلك يعتبرو أيضا . ، والمرونة يهاوسهولة الحصول عل الخدمات توافرضمان ، و وتحسين الأداء
خدمات السحابية ومصدر التي تواجه مقدمي الأكبر التحديات من  موذج خدمة الحوسبة السحابية واحدنالذي يوفره 
 عملاء الخدمات السحابية.قلق كبير ل
الدفع لمزود الخدمة ، و وقابلية التوسع التلقائي،  وفرة الموارد : جذابة مثلالملامح العديد من الوسبة السحابية للح
تقليل تكاليف التشغيل وتعظيم على  الحوسبة السحابية عملاءه الميزات يمكن أن تساعد . هذبحسب استخدام الموارد
) SoDD(هجوم الحرمان من الخدمة الموزعة ق طلهذه الميزات واالمهاجم  استغللكن إذا الاستفادة من الموارد. 
يطلق عليه هجوم الحرمان  ،الى نوع جديدة من الهجمات الهجوم هذا سيتم تحويل فإنه  ؛ الحوسبة السحابية بيئةعلى 
 .)SoDE( ستدامةللا الاقتصادي
 الحوسبة السحابيةكبيرة من طلبات الخدمة نحو  كميات يا  لعندما ترسل آالحرمان الاقتصادي للاستدامة يحدث هجوم 
 طلبات لإستعاب وخدمة الموارد في . الأمر الذي ينجم عنه نمو كبيرمن قبل أجهزة مخترقة وموجهة من المهاجم
سيضطر الى دفع كل  عميلال نإف؛ لية الدفع حسب الاستخدام في نموذج الحوسبة السحابية آوبوجود  ، المهاجم
بسبب الخسارة ؛ يقدر بعدها على الاستمرار اقتصاديا  لنصل الى درجة ت والتي قد ،التكاليف الناتجة عن الهجوم 
 .الإفلاسالتي تؤدي إلى  الكبيرة
 iixx
 
و تخفف من هجوم الحرمان الاقتصادي أالتي تمنع حاليا  القائمة دراسة تقنيات التخفيف  إلىيهدف هذا البحث 
لتخفيف ومنع هجوم ؛ سوف نقدم تقنية جديدة  بعد ذلكو. الموجودة في كل منها وبيان العيوب الرئيسية ، للاستدامة
من  ، القائمةتقنيات التخفيف الموجودة في عيوب المع الأخذ بعين الاعتبار معظم  ، الحرمان الاقتصادي للاستدامة
على عوامل  لخدمات السحابية لكل مستخدم بناء  الى موارد ايتم منح إذن الوصول سوف  .خلال التقنية المقترحة
 ، )LRUمحدد موقع المعلومات ( وتقنية إعادة توجيه ، )TTGsتورينج ( بارات الرسمتاجتياز اخ : مختلفة مثل
 ).MSPRفي الثانية (المسموح المتزامنة  اتطلب، وال )FTلمستخدم (عامل الثقة لو
التوسع التلقائي لموارد الخدمة عتبات و ،التلقائي  مراقبة ميزة التوسعبالتقنية المقترحة  تقوم ، سوف في البداية
، فإن  بمجرد اكتشاف الهجوم. الحرمان الاقتصادي للاستدامةهجوم وجود لإذا كان هناك  ماعللكشف ؛ السحابية 
 المستخدمين ةجل التحقق من شرعيأمن جميع الطلبات القادمة الى عنصر الفحص  فورا   تحيلة يسحابالخدمة ال
 الفحص، سيقوم عنصر  في وقت لاحق ).seibmoZ( ينوالمهاجمين الآلي والتمييز بين المستخدمين الشرعيين
وجيه طلبات المستخدمين الشرعيين في حين سيتم ت ، ينالآلي ينمهاجمالطلبات الناتجة عن الإسقاط حركة المرور أو ب
خلف جهاز  اكانو وإنالمستخدمين حتى المنهج المقترح لديه القدرة على تحديد شرعية  .الحوسبة السحابية إلى خوادم
ترجمة عنوان  المعتمدة على شبكةلا حجبتجنب لديه القدرة كذلك على و .)TANتوجيه ترجمة عنوان الشبكة (
 من الوصول إلى الخوادم السحابية.وبالتالي تمكينهم  .الشرعيين مستخدمينتستضيف ال والتي قدبشكل كامل  الشبكة
نخطط  نحن بالإضافة إلى ذلكو ، (miSduolC)يتم تقييم فعالية تقنية التخفيف المقترحة باستخدام محاكاة سوف 
لتقييم ؛  (SoDE-)dleihSدرع هجوم الحرمان الاقتصادي للاستدامة بين نهجنا الجديد وتقنية  موازنةجراء لإ
 .أسلوبنا المقترح
 ؛ على ذلك علاوة. الآليالشرعي والمهاجم  بنجاح بين المستخدم تميزأن التقنية المقترحة  نتائج المحاكاة أظهرت
المستخدمين الى نفس الشبكة عندما ينتمي هؤلاء  وخصوصا  حاليا  تفوق على التقنيات الموجودة فإن التقنية المقترحة ت
لن الحرمان الاقتصادي للاستدامة هجمات ، فقد بينت النتائج أن  إلى ذلك إضافة مدة على ترجمة عنوان الشبكة.لمعتا
 .مزود الخدمات السحابية طرف لدىالتلقائي عند تنفيذ التقنية المقترحة  الحوسبة السحابية على التوسع تجبر
 
 
 
1 
 
1 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Cloud computing is a new pattern of computing in which on-demand network access to 
the computing resources, utility-based pricing model, and dynamic resource assignment 
are granted as a service over the Internet [1, 2]. The cloud resources can be rapidly 
provisioned and freed almost without any interaction and low management effort by the 
service provider. Cloud computing technology has been identified as the topmost 
technology with the potential for significant impact on organizations in 2011 [3]. 
Moreover, Gartner technology research company in the US has highlighted cloud 
computing as one of the top 10 strategic technologies group that companies should look 
to make deliberate decisions about them during 2015 and the next two years [4]. 
Cloud computing has provided a novel paradigm to address the critical need for 
affordable and convenient resource availability to meet the large scale computing 
demands of contemporary applications. The cloud paradigm provides various features 
that are different from traditional network such as on-demand network access, dynamic 
resource assignment, shared resource pooling, service oriented, multi-tenancy, self-
organizing, and pay for use pricing model. 
Pay per Use is the base model in cloud computing wherein vendors and service providers 
do not have to procure and maintain hardware and software resources to sustain their 
respective computing activity. Rather, cloud services are purchased on a need basis.  The 
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cloud service provider will automatically scale the cloud resources when the user’s traffic 
increases and accordingly the cost on the consumer also increases. 
Auto scaling model may put the providers of cloud application at risk by skillful attackers 
who intend to increase the cost for a consumer. For example, the attackers synthetically 
generate a huge traffic of HTTP requests to the cloud web application exploiting the 
elasticity and auto scaling features on the cloud to charge a cloud adopters bill an 
exorbitant extra amount of costs due to the pay for use model. These requests are not 
profitable for the attackers but they are accounted for billing the customers. Thus, such an 
attack, technically labeled as Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS) attack, will 
cause a sustainable descent for the consumers’ economy. 
In this work, we study several existing mitigation techniques that prevent or mitigate the 
EDoS attack and state all drawbacks of these techniques. Then, a new approach is 
proposed to mitigate the EDoS attack. This new mitigation technique takes into account 
most of the drawbacks of the existing mitigation techniques. 
 
1.1 Background and Terminology  
 
Cloud computing is based on some existing technologies such as virtualization, utility 
computing, grid computing, and automatic computing. In particular, the virtualization 
technology mainly forms the foundation of cloud computing technology [5]. 
Virtualization is the layer responsible to pool the computing resources from the available 
hardware by allocating and reallocating virtual resources based on demand. 
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Figure 1 Cloud Computing Architecture [5] 
 
The cloud computing services can be classified based on the services delivered to the end 
users into the Infrastructure offered as a Service (IaaS), Platform offered as a Service 
(PaaS), and Software offered as a Service (SaaS), as shown in Figure 1. IaaS refers to 
providing storage and compute capabilities as services, usually through spawning of 
Virtual Machines (VMs) based on the service providers demands. Amazon Elastic 
Compute Cloud (EC2) [6] is an example suite that is built on the IaaS service model. 
PaaS provides a layer of software, such as operating system, as a service for leasing out 
to the service providers in order to sustain design and deployment of application layer 
services. Google App Engine [7] is an example of a PaaS service model. SaaS refers to 
provisioning of software based on the end user demand as a service over the Internet. 
Saleseforce.com [8] is an example of a SaaS service model. 
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There are four types of cloud computing models based on its location. These types are 
private, public, hybrid, and community clouds [5, 9, 10]. A public cloud is a cloud where 
the infrastructure layer is offered by a third party and shared between customers. In 
addition, the client has no control over the data, network, and security settings. A private 
cloud can be of two types, the first one is on premise private cloud in which the 
infrastructure layer is devoted to a specific organization and not common with others. In 
addition, the organization has full control over the data, network, and security settings. 
The second type of private cloud is an externally hosted private cloud, virtual private 
cloud, in which the infrastructure layer is used by one organization but offered by a third 
party. The virtual private cloud is less costly than the on premise private cloud. A hybrid 
cloud is defined as a blend of private and public clouds where the customers could host 
critical applications on their private cloud and non-critical applications on the public 
cloud. Also, this type of cloud computing is used for the infrastructure layer. For 
example, private computing infrastructure could be used for daily and normal activity. 
However, if there is a high activity in the network such as flash crowd effect, then the 
computing infrastructure could be expanded by renting more resources from the public 
cloud infrastructure. Then, these resources may be released when not needed or the 
activity returns to normal. Finally, a community cloud is used to share the infrastructure 
layer between organizations or companies of the same community. 
According to a recent survey under the supervision of the International Data Corporation 
(IDC) [11], security has been positioned as the major challenge of cloud computing 
model. Nearly 87% of IT executives reported the cloud security as the principal challenge 
prohibiting the adoption of the cloud computing services model, as shown in Figure 2. 
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Security anxieties have driven organizations to hesitate in moving their basic assets and 
resources to the cloud. Companies and individuals are generally worried about how 
security, consistency, and trustworthiness can be kept up in this new environment. Also, 
adoption of public or community cloud environments for hosting critical applications and 
sensitive data will exacerbate anxiety for corporations since their datacenters network 
boundary protection is not on hand. With security being one of the top concerns that 
hinders cloud computing environment [12-16], it has become a major field of study. 
 
 
Figure 2 Cloud Challenges Survey [11] 
 
The aspect of cloud computing security is wide and general. Therefore, it is imperative to 
introduce two types of network security threats, Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed 
Denial of Service (DDoS). The DoS and the DDoS attacks overwhelm a network 
infrastructure or service by employing a distributed number of malicious or infected 
machines to perform unwanted operations intended to cause damage to the IT 
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infrastructure of an organization. For example, a botnet that is made up of a collection of 
malicious machines participating in an attack can be activated to overwhelm a web server 
using an asynchronous DDoS attack. Such an attack makes the site unavailable to end 
users due to an exhaustion of its computing or network resources [17]. The next 
subsection explains the effect of DDoS on the cloud computing service. 
 
1.2 Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS) 
 
The cloud computing model permits the customers to scale their resources in size and 
availability. Note that the customers of the cloud computing model are charged 
depending on the pay as you go premise of the cloud's instances and network resources, 
otherwise known as the utility computing.  
Such a service model may appear to overcome the effects of a DDoS attack where the 
resource bottlenecks are eliminated. However, this model merely transforms the 
traditional DDoS attack to a new strain of attacks that target the cloud customer’s 
economic resource to charge their bill an exorbitant extra amount of costs, originally 
labeled as Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS) attack [18].  
The EDoS attack takes advantage of some attractive features in the cloud computing 
environment such as elasticity, auto scaling, and pay per use model. Auto scaling is one 
of the attractive features of a cloud computing environment, this feature allocates 
automatically more instances or resources to handle the high load (scale up) and release 
automatically these resources when the load or traffic returns back to normal (scale 
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down). The auto scaling could be activated by monitoring some parameters such as 
resources utilization, memory usage, response time, and network bandwidth. 
The EDoS attack is a major threat in the cloud computing environment. EDoS occurs 
when zombie machines send a large amount of undesired traffic towards the cloud 
computing system [19]. This attack is not only causing the service to be unavailable or 
down but also it is causing a tremendous economic loss to the cloud customer. 
The main source of the EDoS attack is the DDoS attack targeting the cloud resources. 
Because of the elasticity and auto scaling features, the resources will grow according to 
the demand of the DDoS attack, and due to the pay as you go model of the cloud the 
customers will be charged for the scaling of resources until it reaches a point that it 
cannot sustain economically [20]. Hence, unlike a DDoS attack that could prevent the 
legitimate users from accessing the service for a certain amount of time, an EDoS attack 
could prevent the service provider from delivering the service forever if the attack leads 
to bankruptcy. 
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
 
Cloud computing provides a model to reduce the customers costs related to under-
provisioning, over-provisioning, and under-utilization by moving the organization 
resources to the cloud system [21]. Moreover, it reduces the provisioning time of 
resources for scaling up or down the applications servers when the traffic changes. 
8 
 
However, the scalability feature in the cloud may cause economy loss or bankruptcy 
when the attackers target the cloud service with a huge number of requests. 
Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS) attack is considered as one of the security 
concerns that have hindered the migration of many organizations to the cloud technology. 
This is because an EDoS attack targets the financial constraints of the service provider. It 
exploits the elasticity feature of the cloud by increasing the resources usage which in turn 
they will scale up to accommodate the demand. As a consequence of pay for use model 
of the cloud, service provider will be charged for the attackers activities. Ultimately, the 
economic viability of the service provider becomes unsustainable.  
Figure 3 illustrates the idea of the EDoS attack where the attackers launch a high number 
of requests to the cloud computing services, and subsequently the servers scale up by the 
auto scaling feature to handle this high traffic. Then, the customer has to pay for all 
duplicated servers due to the pay as you go model. Accordingly, the cost for the customer 
increases and economic loss occurs. 
For these reasons, a mitigation technique to identify suspicious service requests that 
target the service provider’s financial resources must be present. Therefore, we propose a 
technique to mitigate the effects of the EDoS attack through controlling the usage of 
resources. 
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Figure 3 Effect of an EDoS Attack against the Cloud 
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1.4 Motivation 
 
According to a survey conducted by International Data Corporation (IDC) [11], the issue 
of security has been rated as the greatest challenge of cloud computing system. In 
particular, malicious attacks against the cloud, such as EDoS attacks, have remained 
largely unaddressed in the literature. 
The disruption of any service provisioned through the cloud can cause large scale damage 
to the end users comprising both novice private end users applications and sophisticated 
business applications. Users of the cloud pay as they use based on application needs. 
Elasticity of resource availability at the service provider is the key driving aspect for the 
growing popularity of the cloud paradigm. Hence, the ability of the service provider to 
differentiate between legitimate and malicious users is critical for smooth and affordable 
resource usage at the cloud computing system. However, a comprehensive mechanism 
for identifying routine cloud usage activity and distinguishing it from malicious activity 
is largely unaddressed in the literature. 
The Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS) attack is a serious threat to the cloud 
computing environment due to its impact on the economic side. We have explored the 
existing mitigation techniques for the EDoS attack. These techniques have a lot of 
weaknesses such as blocking an entire Network Address Translation (NAT) based-
network due to an EDoS attacker that belongs to the NAT-based network. Thus, 
legitimate clients belonging to the blocked NAT-based network will not have the ability 
to access the cloud resources. Accordingly, this work attempts to rectify such a weakness 
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in the existing EDoS mitigation techniques with minimal impact on both the cloud 
service customers and the legitimate clients. 
 
1.5 Objective 
 
The objective of this research is to propose an efficient mitigation technique against 
EDoS attack in the cloud infrastructure. The proposed technique should be able to detect 
and prevent such an attack with a high degree of accuracy while allowing the legitimate 
clients access to the cloud services and use its resources. 
The effectiveness of the proposed mitigation technique will be evaluated through 
simulations. In addition, we will conduct a comparison between the proposed technique 
and other techniques under different scenarios. 
 
1.6 Contribution 
 
The main contributions of this research are as follows: 
 We summarize almost all of research work found in the literature for addressing 
EDoS attack. 
 We propose a novel and reactive approach to detect and mitigate the EDoS attack 
in cloud systems with low cost and overhead. 
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 Our scheme is able to detect malicious users using the Graphics Turing Test 
(GTT), Uniform Resource Locator (URL) redirection technique, Trust Factor 
(TF), and Maximum Requests Per Second (MRPS). 
 Our proposed scheme tracks the users’ behavior and avoids the false positives 
based on the user TF. 
 
1.7 Thesis Organization 
 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides an extensive 
literature review on EDoS attack mitigation techniques and the methods used for 
identifying the clients that belong to a NAT-based network. We provide an elaborate 
explanation of our proposed scheme in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, we discuss the simulator 
implementation used to evaluate the proposed mitigation technique. Experimental results 
and their analysis are presented in Chapter 5. Finally, Chapter 6 includes the conclusions 
and future directions for our work. 
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2 CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Cloud computing security is a critical issue that concerns many enterprises that are 
considering moving their services to the cloud. Subsequently, many researchers have 
focused on the Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS) attack due to its severe impact 
on the cloud service customer’s bill. In this section, we present a detailed literature 
review on EDoS attack mitigation techniques and the methods used to identify the clients 
that belong to a NAT-based network. 
 
2.1 EDoS Attack Mitigation Techniques 
 
An auto scaling technique, namely CloudWatch [22], has been enabled by Amazon to 
reduce the effects of the EDoS attack by monitoring the cloud resources. CloudWatch 
gives the customers a control to define the limits of the cloud platforms elasticity and 
thus reduce the EDoS attacks effects. However, this control technology will freeze the 
cloud service when elasticity reaches the pre-defined upper pound threshold and thus the 
legitimate users will not be able to access the cloud services until refreshing the quota 
again which leads to similar demeanor of DoS and DDoS attacks. In addition, the cloud 
service customers will be charged to some degree determined by the pre-defined 
thresholds of the cloud platforms elasticity during the attack. For these reasons, 
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CloudWatch cannot be deemed as one of the effective techniques for mitigating the 
EDoS attack. 
Self-verifying Proof of Work (sPoW) is another approach that focuses on proving client 
commitment through solving crypto-puzzles [23]. The proposed approach introduced an 
asymmetric step before committing the server's resources. Clients request for server 
access at the cloud provider’s end by first defining the crypto-puzzle difficulty level, k, 
and subsequently requesting access. A server has to generate a crypto-puzzle to protect 
the connection server channel. A crypto-puzzle consists of both the encryption of channel 
information and the concealed encryption key with k bits representing the puzzle 
difficulty. A puzzle requester running on the client-side expands the client resources by 
brute forcing these k bits to discover the server channel information. The proposed 
approach prioritizes the traffic based on the difficulty of the puzzle. If an initial 
connection request is not successfully made during a given frame of time, the client may 
request for a more difficult puzzle to solve. Upon succeeding in solving a puzzle of a 
given complexity, the server establishes a secure communication channel to exchange 
messages with the client. sPoW has several shortcomings such as asymmetric 
consumption power problem due to generating and solving the puzzles by servers and 
clients respectively, puzzle accumulation attack when the attacker responds with high 
difficult unsolved puzzles to the server, and puzzle’s difficulty impact on false positives. 
Sqalli et al. [24] proposed a mitigation technique called EDoS-Shield to protect the cloud 
against EDoS attacks. The key factor proposed for differentiating between legitimate and 
EDoS requests is through verification of human presence to control an end-user machine. 
The EDoS-Shield architecture consists of two main components. The first component is a 
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virtual Firewall (vFirewall) and it works as a filter mechanism to the incoming requests 
based on two lists, white list and black list, which hold the IP addresses of clients 
targeting the cloud application. The second component is a verifier cloud node (V-Node) 
and it uses the Graphic Turing test to verify legitimate requests. Then, it updates the 
whitelist and the blacklist based on the verification process outcome. If a user passes the 
Graphic Turing test, the user’s IP address will be held in the white list and subsequent 
requests from the same IP address will be forwarded directly to the cloud scheduler for 
providing necessary services. In contrast, if a user fails the Turing test, the user’s IP 
address will be held in the black list and subsequent requests from this IP address will be 
dropped by the firewall. However, the proposed approach has shortcomings. One of them 
is its vulnerability to IP spoofing. This problem might cause an EDoS attack if an attacker 
spoofs an IP address belonging to the whitelist of the verifier node. Another disadvantage 
is the false positives, in which the EDoS-Shield may unknowingly block a NAT IP 
address that corresponds to thousands of legitimate users due to the misbehaving of one 
attacker that belongs to the same NAT-based network. Likewise, the problem of false 
negatives can take place when IP addresses that belong to the whitelist change their 
behavior to harm the system. Finally, the EDoS-Shield adds an overhead on the firewall 
when checking the IP address of each incoming request, whereas our proposed mitigation 
technique checks the user’s legitimacy only when there is abnormal behavior on the 
requested cloud service. 
An enhanced version of the EDoS-Shield is proposed in [25]. The authors improved the 
EDoS-Shield and proposed an Enhanced EDoS-Shield that takes into account the spoofed 
IP addresses. This technique appends a Time To Live (TTL) value with the packet’s IP 
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address of cloud service request and adds a counter of unmatched TTL values to the 
white and black lists to decide whether the packet is having a spoofed IP address or not. 
The mean absolute variance of the TTL values was used to identify anomalous network 
traffic in [26, 27]. The results show that the Enhanced EDoS-Shield is an efficient 
technique to mitigate EDoS attacks especially with those using spoofed IP addresses. 
However, the Enhanced EDoS-Shield mitigation technique is based on the IP addresses 
lists approach that has many drawbacks such as blocking an entire NAT-based network if 
an attacker that belongs to the NAT-based network is added to the black list. In addition, 
cloud services are accessible from everywhere, so it is difficult to recognize clients 
fingerprint and their TTL values. Moreover, there are some attack tools that could change 
the value of TTL, so this value is not always correct and cannot be trusted [28]. Finally, 
the Enhanced EDoS-Shield adds an extra overhead on the firewall when checking the IP 
address and its TTL value for each request. This overhead will affect the response time of 
the legitimate requests even with the normal behavior on the requested cloud service. 
A discussion and a description of Economic Distributed Denial of Sustainability 
(EDDoS) in cloud computing has been presented in [29]. The authors proposed a 
mitigation technique for EDDoS attack. This mitigation technique is an in-cloud EDDoS 
mitigation web service comprising three modules, namely, packet filtering, proof-of-work 
technique, and egress filtering to avoid EDDoS attacks to the cloud. The clients of the 
cloud service must prove their commitment for gaining service access by solving the 
crypto puzzle. Only clients succeeding in solving the crypto puzzle are granted access to 
the cloud services. The authors focused on building an effective crypto puzzle [30], but 
this puzzle adds a computation overhead on the client side. In addition, in the cloud 
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computing environment, there are varieties of clients such as mobile clients, tablet 
clients, etc. These clients cannot handle the computation overhead to solve the crypto 
puzzle in order to gain access to cloud services. Moreover, Gligor et al. [31] stated that 
the client puzzles used as a proof of work are superfluous and ineffectual as they force a 
high overhead on the legitimate users requests and just offer extremely feeble assurances. 
Another limitation of the proposed scheme is the puzzle accumulation attack at the 
puzzle’s generation server. 
In-Cloud Scrubber Service [32] is another mitigation technique for the EDoS attack 
provided by the cloud service provider as a separate service to check the users legitimacy. 
In-Cloud Scrubber Service will be responsible for the generation and verification of 
puzzles, so there is no overhead on the cloud service. The proposed mitigation technique 
uses two modes of operation, normal mode and suspected mode. When the web server is 
working as expected, then the system will work in the normal mode. But when the 
service provider notices that the traffic that targets the web server exceeds an acceptable 
threshold, then the operation will be switched to the suspected mode. In-Cloud Scrubber 
Service is used while the cloud service is operating in the suspected mode. It will send 
crypto puzzles to the clients to distinguish legitimate requests from bot requests. The 
proposed mitigation has some limitations such as the disadvantage of the crypto puzzles, 
as mentioned earlier, and the threshold limit. The system could be unstable due to a 
fluctuation in the traffic activity around the threshold limit frequently. 
The authors in [33] propose an approach for ensuring that HTTP and XML based DDoS 
attacks do not trigger the auto scaling feature of the cloud, thus ensuring that an EDoS 
does not transpire through such an attack. The contribution mainly focuses on studying 
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the ability of a DDoS attack to cause an EDoS attack against the cloud through protocol 
vulnerability exploitation. They conducted some experiments on Amazon public cloud. 
Their results show that the proposed protection technique will not eliminate completely 
the EDoS attack and more research is needed to prevent and mitigate the EDoS attack.  
Alosaimi et al. [34] proposed a new mitigation technique to encounter the EDoS attack in 
a new cloud environment. This environment is where “Bring Your Own Device” 
(BYOD) policies in enterprises are defined. The attack is targeting the Identity and 
Access Management (IAM) weaknesses in the BYOD implementation of the 
organizations to gain access to the internal resources of the organizations and launch an 
EDoS attack. This attack is taking advantage of the missing of resource control and 
management of platforms of the BYOD devices. This attack could cause Direct DDoS to 
the organization itself or cause indirect DDoS to other organizations that use the same 
cloud service provider. Their mitigation technique is called DDoS-Mitigation System 
(DDoS-MS). It investigates only two packets from the source of the requests by 
performing two tests, the Crypto Puzzles test and Graphic Turing test. The two types of 
testing are used to authenticate the packet and the user, respectively. In addition, this 
technique uses the black and white lists based on IP addresses to control the access to the 
cloud services, a verifier node and puzzle server for verification process, a DNS server, 
and a filtering router. The proposed framework reduces the end-to-end delay of the users’ 
requests. However, problems such as false positives and false negatives are still 
unaddressed by this technique. 
An enhanced DDoS-Mitigation technique [35] has been proposed to improve the DDoS-
MS mitigation technique. The proposed system investigates only the first packet by using 
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Graphic Turing test. The enhanced DDoS-MS consists of a virtual firewall, verifier 
nodes, a client puzzle server, an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) device, and a Reverse 
Proxy (RP) server. The virtual firewall has four different lists, the black list, the white 
list, the suspicious list, and the malicious list. The IPS is used to investigate the packet for 
malicious content such as malware. The RP server is responsible for hiding the locations 
of cloud servers, and for balancing the load between these servers. In addition, it 
monitors the rate of traffic to detect DDoS attacks. The client puzzle server is used as a 
reactive step to delay the requests of a user who tries to overwhelm the system. DDoS-
MS and Enhanced DDoS-MS have many drawbacks such as blocking an entire NAT-
based network, as mentioned earlier, adding a huge overhead on the system because of 
the use of three layers of filtering; firewall, IPS, and RP, and using the TTL value which 
is not always correct and cannot be trusted. 
The author of [36] proposed a mitigation technique called EDoS Armor against EDoS 
attack for e-commerce applications in cloud environment. The EDoS Armor has dual 
defense system; the admission control and the congestion control. The admission control 
is used to limit the number of clients who are accessing the cloud services at the same 
time. The congestion control is used to assign priority to the permitted clients based on a 
browsing behavior learning mechanism. The learning mechanism is used to classify the 
clients into good and bad, based on the client activities in the system. Moreover, a 
challenge server is used to authenticate users into the system by sending a challenge for 
each client at the beginning of the session. The EDoS Armor has some limitations such as 
restraining the elasticity feature of the cloud in which the simultaneous user requests for 
cloud service are limited by the admission control. In addition, the average response time 
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of the good clients is rather high because of the continuous learning mechanism and the 
priority updating process. Another disadvantage is the false positives, in which the EDoS 
Armor may unknowingly block a NAT IP address that corresponds to thousands of 
legitimate users due to the misbehaving of one attacker that belongs to the same NAT-
based network. 
A novel approach for detecting and mitigating the effects of an EDoS attack against the 
auto scaling feature of the cloud is proposed in [37]. This scheme is implemented at the 
service provider’s end with normal or suspicious classification to the incoming requests. 
Subsequently, further investigation is directed to guarantee that priority to access the 
cloud service is given to legitimate clients, while suspect clients are given less primacy to 
access the cloud system until they are ultimately expelled from the suspicion list. The 
architecture of this technique consists of virtual Firewall (vFirewall), Job Scheduler, VM 
Observer and VM Investigator. The vFirewall is used with white and black lists with the 
white list user requests being directed to the VMs. On the other hand, those requests 
found to be originating from blacklisted users are directly sent forth to the VM 
Investigator. The Job Scheduler is responsible for distribution of jobs to individual VMs. 
The VM Observer process resides within each VM and it is responsible for probing the 
resource usage within the VM. Upon observing exceeding resource usage at a VM, the 
VM Observer redirects subsequent requests to the VM Investigator for further analysis. 
The VM Investigator uses a User Trust Factor (UTF) parameter to calculate the number 
of accesses that can be provided to a given user in a given time frame. The UTF is 
updated depending on the result of the user’s Turing test. When the UTF value reaches 
zero, all subsequent requests from this IP address are dropped. Through this scheme, 
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none of the requests that surpass the defined thresholds of resource usage are dropped, 
but rather the users are provided with a delayed access to the cloud services based on the 
UTF value. However, the proposed approach sets a limit on the number of requests that a 
user can submit to the cloud infrastructure. This can be significantly less than the number 
of requests a legitimate user may have. Hence, this will result in an increase in the 
response time for such users. Such a limitation can be magnified for legitimate users that 
belong to a NAT-based network. 
The authors in [38] proposed a detection technique against EDoS attack based on the 
Time Spent on a web Page (TSP) that represents the duration spent on viewing a website. 
A massive quantity of very few TSP values indicates a botnet targeting the web page 
[39]. The average TSP value resulting from the attack payload will be different from the 
mean TSP of a website. The TSP deviation from the mean value can be calculated in 
terms of Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD). A MAD plot method and foot step graph 
method plot the deviation and the TSP’s respectively to identify the various types of 
attack traffic. However, the proposed detection technique requires human intervention to 
monitor and interpret the plots. 
Modi et al. [40] surveyed the intrusion detection techniques that can be used in the cloud 
system. They listed many types of attacks that target the cloud system. They describe the 
flooding attack and how this attack could increase the costs for the customers 
significantly as the cloud system would not be able to differentiate the legitimate traffic 
from the malicious traffic. They described the EDoS attacks and they claimed that some 
of the proposed mitigation techniques are not efficient since they only use traditional 
firewalls as firewalls cannot differentiate the legitimate requests from DoS attack 
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requests. In addition, they state that more research is needed to prevent and mitigate the 
EDoS attack.  
A mitigation technique called Index Page Attack Defender (IPA-Defender) is presented 
in [41]. The IPA-Defender focuses on detecting and mitigating an EDoS attack that 
targets the index page of any website because it is provided freely and without 
authentication. The Iptables is used to implement the scheme. The idea of the IPA-
Defender is to check each request for the index page. If the page count threshold of the 
requester is crossed, the IPA-Defender drops the current request and the subsequent 
requests of that requester by maintaining its IP address in the blacklist for a period of 
time. Then, the IP address will be removed from the blacklist upon completion of the 
blocking period allowing the user to re-request the index page. The IPA-Defender might 
be inefficient to detect fraud requests that rely on the page count threshold. Moreover, the 
proposed scheme is susceptible to the false positive problem. 
Saleh et al. [42] proposed a framework to address all sorts of HTTP DoS/DDoS attacks. 
Their research aims to design a solution called a Flexible, Collaborative, Multilayer, 
DDoS Prevention Framework (FCMDPF). The innovative design of the FCMDPF 
framework handles all aspects of HTTP-based DoS/DDoS attacks through three 
subsequent framework's schemes. Firstly, an Outer Blocking (OB) scheme that blocks 
attacking IP source addresses when they are listed in a black list table. Secondly, the 
Service Trace Back Oriented Architecture (STBOA) scheme validates whether the 
incoming request is launched by a human or by an automated tool. Then, it traces back 
the true attacking IP source. Thirdly, the Flexible Advanced Entropy Based (FAEB) 
scheme is used to eliminate High Rate DDoS (HR-DDoS) and Flash Crowd (FC) attacks. 
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The FCMDPF framework is flexible because it eliminates the impact of flash crowd 
attacks gradually by decreasing the maximum connection's timeout value plus decreasing 
the maximum allowed requests per this timeout until these two values reach zero. Once 
the values of the timeout and the maximum allowed requests reach zero, the FAEB 
scheme disables the Keep-Alive feature of the HTTP connection. Therefore, the detection 
and prevention mode switches from a flash crowd attack to a high rate DDoS attack. In 
the meanwhile, the FCMDPF framework blocks high rate HTTP DoS/DDoS attacks 
immediately. This framework's design provides a novel alternative protective framework 
to protect web applications from all sorts of HTTP DoS/DDoS attacks, such as HR-DDoS 
and FC. In addition, it is quite able to validate and trace back the real attacking IP 
sources, and block them at the edge router using the OB scheme. In the contrast, it suffers 
from the false negatives, since it was not able to detect and prevent all of the flash crowd 
attacks. In addition, it failed to validate and trace back some of the incoming requests 
such as the requests targeting the system that originated from a NAT-based network. 
Baig et al. [43] proposed a novel technique for detecting and mitigating the effects of an 
EDoS attack. The architecture of this technique consists of virtual Firewall (vFirewall), 
Load Balancer (LB), DataBase (DB) and VMInvestigator. The vFirewall is used with a 
black list table to filter the incoming requests to the cloud computing system. The black 
list user requests are directly sent forth to the VMInvestigator for extra analysis. The load 
balancer is responsible for distributing requests evenly to individual VMs, monitoring 
and auto-scaling the cloud resources. In addition, the LB is responsible for redirecting the 
incoming requests to the VMInvestigator when the CPU utilization of the cloud resources 
exceeds 80%. The DB contains information about the users past behavior. This 
24 
 
information includes the user’s IP address, the time of the last activity on the cloud 
system, the number of requests per minute originated by each individual user, the User 
Trust Factor (UTF) value, and the number of requests per a single second made by each 
individual user. The VMInvestigator uses a Turing test and a UTF parameter to determine 
the user’s legitimacy. The VMInvestigator randomly selects numbers, referred to as 
Random Check (RC) values, from the interval [1, TRPM]. The TRPM is the allowable 
total requests per minute which is equal to 60 multiplied by the pre-defined allowable 
Concurrent Requests Per Second (CRPS). The count of the selected RC values is 
equivalent to the CRPS. Initially, the VMInvestigator checks if the user violates the 
system by sending requests per second greater than the CRPS. The request from a user 
who breaches the CRPS threshold with UTF less than 0.25 will be dropped, whereas the 
user will be requested to provide an answer for the Turing test when breaching the CRPS 
but with UTF greater than or equal to 0.25. On the other hand, the VMInvestigator will 
check if the number of requests per minute from the requester matches any of those 
randomly selected RC values when the user does not breach the CRPS. Subsequently, the 
VMInvestigator will send a Turing test to that user upon matching the RC values. 
Otherwise, the VMInvestigator will check the UTF value when the request number does 
not match any of the RC values. Then, the user will be requested to perform the Turing 
test when the UTF less than 0.25. Otherwise, the user’s request will be directly sent to the 
cloud VMs. Note that if the user failed the Turing test by giving a wrong answer or by 
not providing an answer at all, the UTF value will be decremented by 0.02 and the user’s 
request will be dropped. However, if the user passed the Turing test, the UTF value will 
be incremented by 0.01 and the user’s request will be directly sent to the cloud VMs. 
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The proposed technique by Baig et al. has some limitations such as forcing the legitimate 
users to answer the Turing test even when they are targeting the cloud service with 
requests less than the CRPS. This is due to the case of matching their requests number to 
the RC values. Another disadvantage is the false positives, in which the proposed 
technique may unknowingly block a NAT IP address that corresponds to thousands of 
legitimate users due to the misbehaving of one attacker that belongs to the same NAT-
based network. 
 
2.2 Methods for Identifying Clients that belong to a Network Address 
Translation (NAT) - based Network 
 
Network Address Translation (NAT) devices [44-46] have become a convenient way to 
hide the source of malicious behaviors. In [47], the authors explore how far we can push 
a Machine Learning (ML) approach to identify the behavior of NAT devices using only 
network flows. They showed that detecting the NAT behavior in the analyzed traffic is 
challenging. Moreover, they mentioned that using the TTL field of the IP header to 
differentiate the types of users that belong to a NAT-based network will not be accurate. 
This is mainly because some NAT implementations might not decrement the TTL values 
for some reason, or the TTL values can be hidden or modified by some tools. 
A recognition method of computers that belong to a NAT-based network was proposed in 
[48]. The method uses a proxy authentication that is implemented in a proxy server. Their 
target application was HTTP. They used a realm field in the authentication header and 
associated it to the MAC address of the client computer after the authentication is 
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succeeded. That realm field is shown to the user as a prompt message and is included in 
the authentication header of all HTTP messages sent from the client to the proxy server. 
Their proposed system requires a Java Runtime Environment (JRE) on each client 
machine to run a Java applet. This Java applet is developed by the authors and to be 
downloaded from the proxy server. The purpose of the Java applet is to collect the MAC 
address of the client PC and subsequently used in the realm field. They assumed that a 
web browser has the capability to associate the authentication header with the request as 
soon as the verification has succeeded. Even though this method is successful, it could 
only be used for their target application and the proxy conditions require the JRE code 
that the authors developed. 
Maier et al. [49] analyzed the HTTP user-agent strings to obtain the OS and the browser 
information such as the browser family and version. Then, based on this information, 
they made a decision regarding the presence of a NAT device in the traffic. This 
approach can be used to distinguish between users of different types of browsers such as 
Firefox, Internet Explorer, Safari and Opera. However, the approach cannot distinguish 
between users that utilize the same type of browser, and, therefore, is inefficient in 
distinguishing between legitimate and malicious users when they all belong to the same 
NAT-based network. 
A method for controlling a system against DDoS attacks which prevents a normal user 
from being blocked in Network Address Translation (NAT) was presented in [50]. The 
proposed system used a black list rule table to store the client IP address, the web server 
IP address, and the web server port when excessive web page request traffic or an 
abnormal connection request is detected through the detection engine. The system that is 
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located between a client and a web server receives data requesting information of the web 
server from the client. Subsequently, it halts the transmission of packets other than a 
packet for Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) session connection according to a 
matching result obtained from a black list rule table. As a result, the system transmits a 
virtual IP information data of the corresponding web server to serve the current session. 
Accordingly, the system determines that a user of the received information is a normal 
user when the corresponding client requests information from the web server through the 
use of the received virtual IP information of the corresponding web server. However, the 
proposed method may unknowingly block a NAT IP address that corresponds to 
thousands of legitimate users due to the misbehaving of one attacker that belongs to the 
same NAT-based network. This will occur when the NAT IP address, the web server IP 
address, and the web server port are added to the black list rule table. As a result, the 
proposed system will transmit a URL redirection packet as a response to the first web 
page request after the TCP session connection request to prevent the legitimate users 
from being blocked. However, since both an attacker and the legitimate users may belong 
to the same NAT-based network it cannot be guaranteed that the URL redirection packet 
will reach the legitimate user who has sent the TCP session connection. In addition, there 
will be no benefit from the use of the web server port in the black rule table, knowing that 
the web server port is always 80. 
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3 CHAPTER 3 
THE PROPOSED APPROACH 
In this chapter, we present the proposed EDoS attack mitigation technique for the cloud 
infrastructure that will be referred to as the EDoS Attack Defense Shell (EDoS-ADS). It 
is a reactive technique that detects and mitigates the effects of an EDoS attack against the 
auto scaling feature of the cloud computing model. 
Auto scaling allows the allocation of new resources with minimal management effort for 
the purpose of handling the increased demands on the services and releasing some 
existing resources when these demands decrease. Auto scaling is triggered based on a 
pre-defined threshold duration of some parameters. The cloud computing platform 
administrator could select the average CPU utilization, memory, or response time as the 
auto scaling parameter with predefined threshold and duration based on the specific 
application. The threshold parameter is the point at which the auto scaling is triggered. 
The duration parameter is the period of time during which the auto scaling condition is 
true to trigger the auto scaling. 
The proposed technique makes use of the threshold and the duration parameters that 
accompany the auto scaling conditions. We will use the average CPU utilization 
threshold as a parameter to trigger the auto scaling condition since it is a good indicator 
of the abnormal behavior as well as its importance to maintain the cloud system 
performance and save the cost. The duration value is used in our proposed technique to 
ensure that auto scaling is triggered only for legitimate requests in order to mitigate EDoS 
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attack effects. So, the proposed technique is considered a reactive because it starts 
running only when the threshold parameter is crossed at which time it verifies whether 
the incoming requests are coming from legitimate users or are generated by compromised 
machines (Zombies). Subsequently, it only allows the legitimate users requests to access 
the cloud service and drops all attack traffic. Since the auto scaling feature is managed by 
the cloud provider, the cloud provider is encouraged to implement and offer the EDoS 
mitigation technique as a security feature for the cloud customers. 
 
3.1 Address the Problem of Blocking an Entire NAT-Based Network 
 
It is necessary for EDoS attack mitigation techniques to be able to distinguish between 
legitimate users and attackers when both belong to Network Address Translation (NAT)-
based network. Such a distinction will help in preventing the blocking of an entire NAT-
based network. A NAT is defined as a method of sharing one public IP address for 
several different devices by replacing the source IP address and the source port number 
with the NAT public IP address and a randomly chosen unused port number, 
respectively, as shown in Figure 4 [44, 45, 51]. Note that the port number assigned by the 
NAT router can be used to distinguish between different clients that belong to a NAT-
based network since it is impossible to assign the same port for several active users. 
Subsequently, the source IP address along with the source port number will be used in the 
proposed mitigation technique to address the problems of IP spoofing, the blocking of 
NAT-based networks, and distinguishing the different types of users targeting the cloud 
services.  
30 
 
 
Figure 4 Network Address Translation (NAT) Working Principle 
 
 
3.2 Differentiate Between Legitimate Users and Automated Attackers 
 
It is essential for an EDoS attack mitigation technique to differentiate between legitimate 
users and automated attackers. The proposed mitigation technique will differentiate the 
traffic using two techniques. Graphic Turing Tests (GTTs) [52] and Uniform Resource 
Locator (URL) redirection [53]. Subsequently, it will drop the request in case of a failure 
to respond to either the GTT or the URL redirection, and will mark the request generator 
as an attacker. 
 
3.2.1 Graphic Turing Test (GTT) 
 
All mitigation techniques that have been studied in the literature used Completely 
Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart (CAPTCHA) [54-58] 
to differentiate between legitimate users and automated attackers. CAPTCHAs are 
designed to be easy for humans but unbreakable by machines. However, Bursztein et al. 
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[59] proved that CAPTCHAs are often difficult for humans and are breakable by 
machines. In [60], the authors provided a study about reCAPTCHA and they mentioned 
that reCAPTCHAs are currently more secure than the conventional CAPTCHAs because 
they use only words from scanned books to which OCR fails, while CAPTCHAs generate 
their own randomly distorted characters. Additionally, they reported that the overall 
success rate for reCAPTCHA was 96.1%, based on more than 1 billion responses from 
English speaking, and the average time spent in solving reCAPTCHA was lower than the 
time required to solve a standard CAPTCHA. Subsequently, the proposed mitigation 
technique will make use of reCAPTCHA Turing test for differentiating between 
legitimate users and automated attackers. Figure 5 shows an example of a reCAPTCHA 
Turing test. 
 
 
 
Figure 5 reCAPTCHA Turing Test [60] 
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3.2.2 Uniform Resource Locator (URL) Redirection 
 
The URL redirection occurs when a client sends HTTP requests to access a web 
resources located at specific URL. Then, the requested web server issues an HTTP 
response to the client browser with a location field in the header. This implies that the 
client has to redirect to a different URL [61, 62]. We make use of the URL redirection for 
detecting certain clients who send requests without the use of a web browser. 
Subsequently, these clients will be marked as attackers. 
The concept of the URL redirection has been used in preventing the DDoS attacks [50]. 
The proposed mitigation technique determines the client as a normal client if the received 
request includes the virtual IP address of the requested web server that is used in the URL 
redirection technique as discussed in subsection ‎2.2. This indicates that the client is using 
a web browser to request the cloud computing service. On the other hand, the attackers 
will keep requesting the cloud service using the actual IP address of the web server. The 
attackers most likely run a script in an automated machine to generate a huge number of 
requests to target the cloud web servers. The attackers typically do not wait for the cloud 
service response packet and accordingly they will not react to the URL redirection. 
The cloud computing system workflow under the use of the EDoS Defense Shell with the 
URL redirection technique is shown in Figure 6. The proposed mitigation technique will 
generate a TCP SYN-ACK response signal on behalf of the web server if the matched 
client request is a TCP session connection request. Furthermore, the proposed mitigation 
technique transmits the generated TCP SYN-ACK response signal to the client. 
Moreover, it sends a URL redirect response packet to the client system upon receiving an 
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HTTP web page request that includes the actual IP address of the cloud server. The rest 
of the process follows the URL redirection technique explained in subsection ‎2.2. 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Actions of Individual Packet Processing Operations 
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3.3 EDoS Attack Defense Shell (EDoS-ADS) 
 
The proposed EDoS Attack Defense Shell mitigation technique depends operationally on 
the use of CPU utilization thresholds. In order to avoid the fluctuation of the cloud 
average CPU utilization, we will use four thresholds with two timers as shown in Figure 
7. These thresholds are scaling-up upper threshold, scaling-up lower threshold, scaling-
down upper threshold, and scaling-down lower threshold with assumed values of 80%, 
75%, 30%, and 35%, respectively [43, 63, 64]. The auto scaling timers are the upper 
threshold timer and the lower threshold timer with assumed durations of 5 minutes and 1 
minute, respectively [43, 64]. 
 
 
Figure 7 CPU Utilization Thresholds 
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To illustrate how these thresholds and timers will be used, consider the cloud service 
without a mitigation technique. The allocation of new resources will occur when the 
average CPU utilization is above 80% for 5 minutes. Now consider that the utilization 
surpasses the 80% threshold for less than 5 minutes, then goes down but still above 75% 
and lasts for less than 1 minute then returns back up to exceed the 80% threshold, then it 
will be counted as if it was above the 80% threshold for the whole time. Thus, auto 
scaling will be triggered and will not be affected by the momentary drop in the 
utilization. The same technique will be used in the case of releasing some existing 
resources. 
The proposed mitigation technique will make use of the scaling-down upper and lower 
thresholds for releasing some of the existing resources. On the other hand, the scaling-up 
upper and lower thresholds will be used to trigger the EDoS-ADS. Further clarification 
will be provided in the rest of this section. 
The EDoS-ADS mitigation technique has four modes for the cloud computing 
environment. These modes are normal mode, suspicion mode, flash overcrowd mode, 
and attack mode as illustrated in Figure 8. The normal mode indicates that the number of 
requests that arrive at the cloud service component are below the scaling-up utilization 
thresholds. However, the system transitions to the suspicion mode when the current 
utilization surpasses the scaling-up utilization thresholds. If this increase in the number of 
requests comes from malicious clients, the system moves to the attack mode. Otherwise, 
the system transitions to the flash overcrowd mode indicating that these requests are from 
legitimate clients. The EDoS-ADS will work differently in the suspicion mode than in 
the attack mode. For simplicity, we will use the term Suspicion Shell when referring to 
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the proposed technique when working under the suspicion mode, and the term Attack 
Shell when referring to the proposed technique when working under the attack mode. 
 
 
Figure 8 EDoS Attack Defense Shell Modes 
 
The cloud service will start operating in the normal mode. The load balancer will 
forward all incoming requests to the cloud servers. The cloud service responds to the 
clients’ requests without any overhead or checking as shown in Figure 9. We consider the 
cloud computing environment in the normal mode if the average CPU utilization did not 
violate the scaling-up upper threshold. The normal mode indicates that the number of 
requests that arrive at the cloud service is as usual. 
The cloud service load balancer will monitor the current utilization of a cloud service 
system and the auto scaling utilization thresholds. If the system current utilization is 
greater than the scaling-up upper threshold, referred to as the suspicion region, then the 
normal mode will be changed to suspicion mode and all incoming requests will be 
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directed to the Suspicion Shell for further investigations. For example, the cloud mode 
will immediately change to suspicion mode when the average CPU utilization exceeds 
80%.  
 
 
Figure 9 Cloud Service Architecture 
 
Hence, the load balancer is responsible for auto scaling and for monitoring the average 
CPU utilization on the cloud. The load balancer will redirect the incoming requests to the 
cloud servers or to the EDoS-ADS (Suspicion Shell or Attack Shell) depending on the 
current mode and the current CPU utilization level. Figure 10 shows the workflow for 
this component. In addition, the load balancer will be responsible for switching the cloud 
mode from the flash overcrowd mode to the normal mode after provisioning of new VM 
instances. 
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Figure 10 Cloud Service Load Balancer Workflow 
 
The EDoS-ADS is responsible for differentiating between legitimate users and automated 
attackers by sending GTTs to the request generator. The EDoS-ADS will drop the request 
in case of a failure to respond correctly to the GTT and considers the request generator as 
an attacker. On the other hand, the EDoS-ADS will forward all requests that pass the 
GTT to the cloud service. However, by continuously sending GTTs to the normal clients 
will likely make them less motivated to use the cloud computing services. Subsequently, 
the EDoS-ADS will make use of the URL redirection technique as explained in 
subsection ‎3.2.2 to eliminate such a problem. Figure 11 shows the architecture of the 
EDoS-ADS. 
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Once the current utilization within the suspicion region, the system needs to determine 
whether the cloud service is under an attack mode or a flash overcrowd mode. To assist 
the system in making that decision, the system tracks the past behavior of clients. As 
such, the system stores information about each client in a Database. The information 
stored includes the IP address, source port number, status, a Trust Factor (TF), Last Seen, 
and the Concurrent Requests Per Second (CRPS). Table 1 represents an example of the 
stored information for each client in the Behavior table.  
 
 
Figure 11 EDoS Attack Defense Shell Architecture 
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Table 1 Behavior Table 
IP Port Status TF Last Seen CRPS 
11.10.10.1 3254 Legitimate 0.79 2014-10-07 01:00:10 2 
194.66.82.11 9842 Suspicious 0.52 2014-10-07 07:10:26 1 
… … … … … … 
22.231.113.64 2314 Malicious 0.13 2014-10-07 09:25:03 6 
22.231.113.64 6405 Legitimate 0.86 2014-10-07 04:25:03 5 
 
 
The EDoS-ADS uses the IP address and the port number as the client key. The status 
field represents the current status of a client in the cloud system which could be one of 
three status types; Legitimate, Suspicious, or Malicious. The TF is a value in the range of 
[0, 1] assigned to each client depending on the client’s response to the GTT. A TF value 
close to 1 indicates a high trust factor and that the associated client is likely trust worthy. 
The Last Seen keeps the time for the last request to each client and it is used to update the 
value of the CRPS. The CRPS is used to keep the total count of the client’s requests per 
second. The value of the CRPS will be incremented by 1 when the request arrival time 
matches the Last Seen time. Otherwise, the EDoS-ADS will reset the value of the CRPS 
to 1 and the value of the Last Seen will be updated to the request arrival time. 
The TF value is initially set by the Suspicion Shell when a new request from a new client 
passes the EDoS-ADS. A value of 0.5 is used as a default value for the TF. The TF value 
is incremented or decremented according to the finite state machine shown in Figure 12. 
The client transitions between the different states considering the source IP address, the 
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source port number, and the current status that are stored in the database according to the 
client’s response to the GTT. Note that the amount of increment of the client’s TF should 
be less than the amount of TF decrement because the failure in the GTT is a possible 
indicator of an attack [65]. Both the status and the TF are affected by the results of the 
reCAPTCHA Turing test. If a new client failed the test by giving a wrong answer or by 
not providing an answer at all, the TF value will be decremented by 0.02 and the client’s 
status will be set to Suspicious. However, if the new client passed the test, the TF value 
will be incremented by 0.01 and the client’s status will be set to Legitimate. 
 
 
Figure 12 Finite State Machine for Updating the Current Status and the TF Value 
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In [66], the authors classified trust factors into three different levels each with a specific 
interval as follows: bad TF is [0, 0.25), average TF is [0.25, 0.75], and good TF is (0.75, 
1] as shown in Table 2. The proposed EDoS-ADS uses these levels to check the client’s 
legitimacy. The clients within the good TF level are likely trust worthy. 
 
Table 2 Trust Factor Levels 
TF Level Interval 
Bad TF [0, 0.25) 
Average TF [0.25, 0.75] 
Good TF (0.75, 1] 
 
 
Figure 13 shows the flowchart of the Suspicion Shell. The Suspicion Shell will check 
the type of the incoming request as shown in the dashed border (I). Subsequently, if the 
request is a TCP session connection, the Suspicion Shell will generate a TCP response 
packet on behalf of the cloud web server and will update the Behavior table. The 
Suspicion Shell will update the Behavior table by inserting or resetting the record related 
to the client. It resets the record in the Behavior table because the TCP connection packet 
is an indication of a new client establishing a connection to request the cloud servers 
using the same IP address and port number that was used by another client. 
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Figure 13 Suspicion Shell Flowchart 
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On the other hand, the Suspicion Shell will update the values of Last Seen and CRPS 
related to the client in the Behavior table upon receiving an HTTP web page request. The 
difference between the current time and the Last Seen time of a client is checked when a 
new request from a certain user comes to the Suspicious Shell. If the time difference is 
less than or equal to 1 second, the value of the CRPS will be incremented by 1. However, 
if the time difference is more than 1 second, the value of the CRPS will be reset to 1. 
Then, the Last Seen will be updated to the current time. In addition, the proposed EDoS-
ADS counts the total number of HTTP web page requests. It uses the Total Request 
Count (TRC) parameter for this purpose. The value of the TRC will be incremented upon 
receiving an HTTP web page request, and then it will be used later to determine the next 
cloud service mode. 
The Suspicion Shell differentiates the legitimate and attacker requests as explained in the 
dashed border (II). A new request from a client who sends requests with a CRPS less than 
or equal to the Maximum Requests Per Second (MRPS) threshold will be requested to 
perform the URL redirection. The proposed mitigation technique will send a URL 
redirect packet to the web browser of those clients with CRPS less than or equal to 
MRPS. Later, the client’s browser will use the redirected URL for the current request and 
for any future request to the cloud web server. In such a way, the requests of clients 
requesting the cloud service with CRPS less than or equal to MRPS will be forwarded to 
the cloud servers immediately without the need to send reCAPTCHA Turing test since 
the requests are using the virtual IP address of the cloud web server. The purpose of using 
the URL redirection in such a case is to defend against a DDoS attack and identify smart 
attackers who can guess the MRPS value and send requests without exceeding this value. 
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Accordingly, the Suspicion Sell will protect the cloud servers from such requests by 
dropping them. 
On the other hand, the Suspicion Shell will send a reCAPTCHA Turing test to a client 
sending a new request to the cloud service, if the client’s CRPS is larger than the MRPS, 
and the TF is either average or bad. The purpose of the Turing test is to allow the 
legitimate users to improve their TF and reach a point where they can be treated as good 
users. At the same time, the Turing test will help in detecting the attack requests, and 
accordingly the Suspicion Shell will protect the cloud server from such requests by 
dropping them. Moreover, the Suspicion Shell will reduce the TF of the users generating 
the attack requests. 
In order to reduce the amount of Turing test sent to the legitimate users, the Suspicion 
Shell will make use of the URL redirection technique to eliminate such a problem. The 
proposed mitigation technique will send a URL redirect packet to the web browser of 
those clients with CRPS larger than MRPS and having a good TF. Later, the client’s 
browser will use the redirected URL for the current request and for any future request to 
the cloud web server. In such a way, the requests of clients having a good TF will be 
forwarded to the cloud servers immediately without subjecting them to reCAPTCHA 
Turing tests even when the CRPS is larger than the MRPS threshold since the requests 
are using the virtual IP address of the cloud web server. 
The Suspicion Shell component will keep counting the number of malicious responses 
and record the total in the Malicious Request Count (MRC) parameter. The MRC will be 
incremented by one for every failed reCAPTCHA Turing test and URL redirection. Later, 
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the values of the MRC and the TRC will be used to determine the next cloud service 
mode as represented by the dashed border (III). For early detection of the attack mode, 
we will check the past behavior for clients who failed the reCAPTCHA Turing test. A 
client with Malicious status and bad TF and a CRPS more than the MRPS threshold will 
be marked as an attacker and the current mode will change to attack mode. In addition, 
we will check the TF level and the URL redirection ability for clients targeting the cloud 
service system every 1 minute. This period is referred to as the Flash Timer. If the clients 
targeted the cloud service with CRPS less than or equal to MRPS were able to redirect 
and the clients with CRPS larger than MRPS have a good TF level and their system 
redirected successfully, the cloud mode will change to flash overcrowd mode directly 
without waiting until the expiration of the Suspicion Timer. On the other hand, the 
Suspicion Shell will restart the Flash Timer if the previous condition has not been met. 
The Suspicion Shell will be triggered for a period equal to the Upper Threshold Timer. 
This period is referred to as the Suspicion Timer. If the Suspicion Timer does not expire, 
and the current system utilization decreases to less than the scaling-up lower threshold 
(75%) or it is in between the scaling-up upper and lower thresholds (75% - 80%) for 
more than the Lower Threshold Timer, the cloud mode will be transitioned from 
suspicion mode to normal mode. Moreover, when the Suspicion Timer expires, the 
Suspicion Shell will change the mode of the cloud computing environment to either a 
flash overcrowd mode or an attack mode depending on the percentage of malicious 
responses. The percentage of malicious responses is calculated by dividing the number of 
malicious requests (MRC) over the total number of requests (TRC). If this value is below 
or equal 8%, the current mode will be set to flash overcrowd mode. On the other hand, if 
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it is greater than 8%, then the current mode will be set to attack mode. The use of 8% to 
determine the mode attempts to mimic the real life when some legitimate users cannot 
solve the reCAPTCHA Turing test for some reason, while taking into account the overall 
success rate of solving a reCAPTCHA Turing test is 96.1% based on more than 1 billion 
responses [60]. Moreover, this success rate is in the range of 92.6-96.9% for clients 
whose native language is not English [60]. Therefore, we select 8% as a threshold for 
mode determination. 
During the flash overcrowd mode, new cloud virtual machines will be added, and a 
Provisioning Timer will start. Accordingly, the cloud mode will remain in the flash 
overcrowd mode for the duration of the timer. Due to the allocation of the new VM 
instances the cloud will return to the normal mode [67]. When the cloud is in the flash 
overcrowd mode, all requests will be served directly by the cloud service as in the 
normal mode. 
The cloud mode will be changed to attack mode in two cases as previously mentioned in 
the Suspicion Shell. The first case is when a client fails the reCAPTCHA Turing test 
while having a Malicious status, the client has bad TF, and the client CRPS is more than 
the MRPS threshold. On the other hand, the second case is when the Suspicion Timer 
expires and the percentage of malicious responses is greater than 8%. A detailed inner 
working of the Attack Shell is provided in Figure 14.  
48 
 
 
Figure 14 Attack Shell Flowchart 
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During the attack mode, the proposed EDoS-ADS will eliminate the attacking request by 
using the URL redirection technique while reducing Turing tests for legitimate users. 
Initially, the Attack Shell will check the type of the incoming request whether it is a TCP 
session connection request or an HTTP web page request. This examination is 
represented by the dashed border (I). The Attack Shell will generate a TCP response 
packet on behalf of the cloud web server and update the Behavior table in the same way 
as discussed in the suspicion mode upon receiving a TCP session connection request. 
However, the Attack Shell will check the request legitimacy based on the URL 
redirection technique, or the reCAPTCHA Turing test in the case of an HTTP web page 
request. The Behavior table will be updated in a similar fashion to what was discussed in 
the Suspicion Shell. 
The Attack Shell will differentiate between legitimate and attacker clients as shown in 
the dashed border (II). All clients will be asked to perform redirection in the attack mode. 
The proposed mitigation technique will send a URL redirect packet to the web browser of 
a client targeting the cloud service with requests rate that are less than or equal to the 
MRPS threshold, and that are using the actual IP address of the requested server. On the 
other hand, the requests from a client targeting the cloud service with requests rate larger 
than the MRPS threshold using the actual IP address of the cloud server will be 
immediately dropped. This is because it is an indication of an attack behavior where an 
automated machine is sending huge number of requests to the cloud computing system 
using the actual IP address instead of the virtual IP address passed on to the client 
through a prior URL redirection packet as a result of an earlier request by the same client. 
Hence, there is no need to keep sending URL redirection packets to such a client. In this 
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way the Attack Shell will immediately eliminate the attacker requests and prevent them 
from reaching the cloud servers. The Attack Shell will allow the clients to request the 
cloud service with a dynamic number of requests depending on the client’s TF. This 
dynamic number is referred to as the Allowable-RPS.  
The Client’s browser will use the redirected URL for re-submitting the current request 
and for any future requests to the cloud web server. In such a way, the requests of clients 
targeting the cloud service using the virtual IP address and sending the requests with a 
rate not more than their Allowable-RPS threshold will be forwarded to the cloud servers 
without reCAPTCHA Turing tests. However, the Attack Shell will send reCAPTCHA 
Turing test for those clients targeting the cloud service using the virtual IP address but 
with a CRPS exceeding their Allowable-RPS threshold. The Turing test will help in 
eliminating requests originating from smart attackers while allowing the legitimate users 
to improve their TF.  
The improvement of users TF results in an increase in their Allowable-RPS threshold and 
allows them to target the cloud service with higher requests rate without a need for 
reCAPTCHA tests in subsequent submission of requests. The Allowable-RPS threshold 
is calculated based on the TF value; raising the TF value results in increasing the 
Allowable-RPS threshold exponentially. The proposed mitigation technique will allow 
the legitimate users with TF equal to 1 to target the cloud service with requests up to 36 
Req/sec [68] rather than 4 Req/sec as shown in Figure 15. Accordingly, the Allowable-
RPS threshold can be calculated using the following equation [69]: 
                                Allowable-RPS = ⌊0.444516 × 𝑝𝑜𝑤(81, 𝑇𝐹)⌋                            (3.1) 
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Note that the Allowable-RPS is changed dynamically only for the clients with good or 
average TF level. On the other hand, the Allowable-RPS threshold for the clients with 
bad TF will be fixed to 1. 
 
 
Figure 15 The Allowable Requests Per Second Depending on the Client’s Trust Factor 
 
The cloud computing system remains in the attack mode for a certain amount of duration 
that is referred to as the Attack Timer. During that duration, the Attack Shell continues 
to send Turing tests to requests originators that are targeting the cloud service using the 
virtual IP address of the cloud servers where their CRPS is higher than their Allowable-
RPS threshold. In order to select the period of the Attack Timer, we consider the average 
duration of attacks studied in the literature. The authors in [70] mentioned that the 
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majority of the DoS attacks are relatively short, and 80% of the attacks stayed for less 
than 30 minutes. In addition, NSFOCUS stated in their security report [71] that 93.2% of 
the DDoS attacks in 2013 lasted for less than 30 minutes, similar to what was observed in 
2012. So, we select the Attack Period Time (APT) to be 30 minutes. Subsequently, the 
duration of the attack mode will be calculated by multiplying the APT value by the 
percentage of malicious responses, MRC divided by TRC, which was measured during 
the suspicion mode. 
In the dashed border (III), the Attack Shell needs to determine the next mode for the 
cloud system when its Attack Timer expires. If the percentage of malicious responses is 
greater than 8%, the current mode will not change and the cloud system will stay in the 
attack mode. Accordingly, the Attack Shell will restart its Attack Timer with a new time 
duration which is specified by multiplying the APT value by the percentage of malicious 
responses and reset its TRC and MRC. On the other hand, if the percentage of malicious 
responses is below or equal 8%, then the current mode will be set to either the suspicion 
mode or the normal mode depending on the current CPU utilization. If the average 
utilization is within the suspicion utilization region, the cloud mode will be transitioned 
from the attack mode to the suspicion mode, otherwise the cloud computing system 
returns back to the normal mode. 
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4 CHAPTER 4 
SIMULATOR 
In this chapter, we discuss the simulator implementation used to evaluate the proposed 
mitigation technique. In addition, we present the measured parameters in the simulation. 
Moreover, we illustrate the experimental setup of the proposed mitigation technique 
against EDoS attack. We also verify and validate our simulation by comparing the 
obtained results against the EDoS-Shield mitigation technique results [64]. 
 
4.1 Simulator Design and Modeling 
 
The simulation is implemented using Java programming language. We simulated the 
cloud computing environment using CloudSim [72, 73]. CloudSim is a toolkit used to 
simulate different scenarios of cloud computing. It provides many classes to describe 
datacenters, load balancers, hosts, virtual machine instances, cloudlets (requests), users, 
computational resources, and management policies such as provisioning and scheduling. 
CloudSim framework was designed as a multi-layered software. Its layers and 
architectural components are shown in Figure 16. The CloudSim simulation layer 
delivers support for simulating and modeling the virtualized cloud based data center 
environment which includes the virtual machines, memory, storage, and bandwidth 
management interfaces. This layer handles the fundamental issues such as managing the 
execution of applications, and the hosts provisioning to the virtual machines. The User 
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Code layer is concerned with the basic units such as number of users, number of requests 
and their demand, number of instances and their specifications, virtual machines, and 
load balancer scheduling policies. 
 
 
Figure 16 Layered CloudSim Architecture [73] 
 
In regards to clients requests targeting a cloud-based web service, several studies have 
assumed a random variable having Poisson distribution for both the number of 
customers’ requests and the cloud instances service rate [74-77]. Similarly, the inter 
arrival time and the service time of client requests are considered an exponential 
distribution in a cloud service for most of web applications [78-81]. In addition, the 
assumption of Poisson arrival for the DDoS attack has been discussed in [82-84]. It 
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should be noted that EDoS attack behaves similar to DDoS attack in terms of generating 
malicious flooding traffic. Subsequently, we have assumed Poisson traffic for the EDoS 
attack. The Prime Modulus Multiplicative Linear Congruential Generator (PMMLCG) is 
used for generating random numbers, with the use of initial seeds that were ten million 
apart, and avoiding any overlapping in the random number streams during the simulation. 
The PMMLCG is an efficient generator and one of the most popular methods for 
generating random numbers [85]. 
In the simulation environment, we are considering a single-class service where all cloud 
clients’ requests have the same processing procedure as it has been discussed by Al-
Haidari et al. [64]. For example, we consider delivering the content of a web server such 
as a web page, using the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) over the Internet. Thus, 
considering the service rate as a Poisson distribution in our simulation is a valid 
assumption that will simplify the performance model. 
We have considered the same setup as that of the queuing model presented in [24]. 
Several studies have modeled a web service as a network of queues, in which each virtual 
machine in the distributed system is modeled as a single queue [86, 87]. A cloud-based 
service usually has multi cloud servers offering the service to the cloud customers. Thus, 
a parallel M/M/1 queuing model is used for the cloud service [88-90]. However, cloud 
servers, in reality, have a restricted queuing buffer like M/M/1/K. For convenience, we 
use M/M/1 queuing model with the virtual machine instances due to the fact that the 
cloud computing systems have large finite buffers where the probability of overflow in 
the buffer is negligible [91].  
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According to the queuing model shown in Figure 17, the EDoS attack targets the cloud 
service with rate of λ𝑚, while the rate of legitimate traffic is λ𝑙. According to Poisson 
composition property [92], the aggregated traffic from attack sources and legitimate 
sources each having a Poisson distribution of arrivals results in a Poisson process having 
arrival rate of λ = λ𝑙 + λ𝑚. 
The Load Balancer (LB), which is also designed as M/M/1 queuing model, forwards the 
customers’ requests to one of cloud servers to perform the web application service. It 
ensures an even distribution of the incoming requests among all working cloud servers in 
such a way that each cloud server has an equal probability, 𝑃𝑖, that is equal to 1 𝑆⁄  of 
receiving a request [63, 93], where  𝑃𝑖 is the balancer routing probability to the 𝑖𝑡ℎ server 
in the auto scaling group, and S is the number of running servers in that group. 
Auto scaling is one of the attractive features of a cloud computing environment, this 
feature enables customers to follow the demand curve for their applications closely and 
run their fleet of servers at optimal utilization. For example, new servers will be added to 
the auto scaling group when the average CPU utilization is high. Similarly, customers can 
remove servers when the average CPU utilization of their fleet is low. Auto scaling group 
is the core of the auto scaling service since it represents the servers’ collection. 
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Figure 17 Queuing Model for EDoS Attack Against a Cloud Service [64] 
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4.2 Simulation Measures  
 
Simulation experiments were conducted to simulate a cloud service system under an 
EDoS attack for the purpose of evaluating the cloud service system performance with and 
without the use of a mitigation technique. The key performance indicators include the 
cloud service response time, the utilization of computing resources, and the cloud service 
throughput. In addition, we have measured the cost related to the cloud computing 
resources and the cloud bandwidth allocations due to the EDoS attack. 
 
4.2.1 Response Time 
 
The response time is an important requirement in most of the Service Level Agreements 
(SLAs). The total end-to-end response time of the path without triggering the EDoS 
Attack Defense Shell (EDoS-ADS) includes the Load Balancer (LB) delay and the cloud 
servers’ delay. However, the total end-to-end response time of the path after triggering 
the EDoS-ADS includes the LB delay, the EDoS-ADS delay, and the cloud servers’ 
delay.  
The average end-to-end response time is measured experimentally by calculating the 
average residence time, the departure time (𝐷𝜏) minus the arrival time (𝐴𝜏), for all 
requests, 𝑁, served by the cloud system as shown in the following equation: 
                                                 𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑣𝑔 =
1
𝑁
∑ (𝐷𝜏𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 − 𝐴𝜏𝑖)                                          (4.1) 
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4.2.2 Resources Utilization 
 
The scalability of cloud service can be controlled by varying automatically the number of 
running virtual machine instances in the auto scaling group based on different parameters 
such as the link utilization, and the computing resources utilization [94]. The average 
CPU utilization of the running virtual machine instances is being used in our technique to 
prove the mitigation concept. All incoming requests will be forwarded to the EDoS-ADS 
upon crossing the CPU utilization threshold for further investigation. 
We assume that all cloud servers have the same capacity of computing power, 𝜇𝑖 = 𝜇, 
and the request’s arrival rate at each server is λ𝑖 = λ 𝑆⁄ , as previously mentioned in 
Figure 17. The mean computing utilization is calculated analytically as follows: 
                                                           𝜌 =  λ (𝑆 × 𝜇)⁄                                                     (4.2) 
However, the CPU utilization of every VM instance is calculated experimentally by 
dividing the total server processing time by the total time of simulation. Hence, the 
average CPU utilization is calculated by taking the average of all running servers’ 
utilization as follows: 
                                                 𝜌𝐴𝑣𝑔 =
1
𝑆
∑
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖
𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖
𝑆
𝑖=1                                        (4.3) 
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4.2.3 Throughput 
 
The throughput of the cloud server, with M/M/1 queuing system, can be calculated 
directly from Little’s formula [95] using the following equation: 
                        𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑝𝑢𝑡 = 𝜇 × 𝜌 = 𝜇 × λ (𝑆 × 𝜇)⁄ = (λ𝑙 + λ𝑚) 𝑆⁄                      (4.4) 
Where 𝜇 is the service rate of the cloud server, 𝜌 is the utilization of the cloud server 
(𝜌 ≤ 1), λ = (λ𝑙 + λ𝑚) is the arrival rate which will be distributed among the 𝑆 running 
servers due to load balancing. Thus, each instance will have (λ𝑙 + λ𝑚) 𝑆⁄  as its arrival 
rate. The average throughput of the cloud service with S running instances will be λ. 
However, the throughput of the cloud server is measured experimentally by dividing the 
number of served requests, 𝑁, by the simulation time. The cloud service throughput is the 
aggregated throughput of all cloud servers in the auto scaling group as follows: 
                                         𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑝𝑢𝑡 = ∑
𝑁𝑖
𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖
𝑆
𝑖=1                                    (4.5) 
 
4.2.4 Cost 
 
Several studies [15, 96, 97] have conducted a comparison between the cloud service 
providers taking into account the most important aspects of cloud computing such as the 
costs reduction, flexibility, security, level of service, support, and compliance. The results 
have shown that Amazon Web Services (AWS) is one of the best cloud service providers. 
Moreover, AWS has been ranked as the most popular enterprise cloud service according 
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to the latest quarterly report from Skyhigh Networks [98]. Subsequently, we have used 
the pricing model of AWS. 
The cloud computing system can use one of several pricing models that provide the 
flexibility to optimize the customers’ costs that are offered by service providers and cloud 
adopters. Currently, there are three different pricing models provided by Amazon EC2 to 
the customers. These models are reserved pricing, spot pricing, and on-demand pricing 
[99]. The reserved instances model allows the cloud user to pay one-time fee for 
reserving a cloud server and in turn receives a significant discount depending on the 
server hourly usage. For the spot instances model, the customers will be enabled to bid 
any price they want for purchasing compute capacity by specifying the maximum price 
per hour they are ready to pay for running the server. The on-demand instances model 
allows the customers to pay a constant rate for usage of resources by the hours with no 
commitment.  
In this work, we follow the on-demand pricing model focusing on the costs that are 
related to the computing resources and network traffic volume [99]. In such a way, a 
cloud customer will pay for both bandwidth and computation usage. The cost has been 
calculated as follows: 
                                                𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐵𝑊 = 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐵𝑊 × λ × 𝑇                                          (4.6) 
                                           𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 = 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑉𝑀 × 𝜌 × 𝑆 × 𝑇                                     (4.7) 
                                   𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 = (𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐵𝑊 × λ + 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑉𝑀 × 𝜌 × 𝑆) × 𝑇                        (4.8) 
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Where 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐵𝑊 is the price per input/output GB, λ is the arrival rate in GB/hr., 𝑇 is the 
total running time in hours, 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑉𝑀 is the price of using the computing resources per 
hour, 𝜌 is the average CPU utilization of all computing resources during the period time, 
and 𝑆 is the number of computing resources in the auto scaling group during time 𝑇. 
 
4.3 Simulation Setup  
 
We have conducted numerous experiments to evaluate the proposed technique and 
demonstrate the effect of the EDoS attack against the cloud services. The simulation was 
designed to follow the same assumptions of EDoS-Shield work [24, 64]. Table 3 shows 
the parameters that have been used in the experiments. 
The number of requests that target the cloud computing service is selected depending on 
the arrival rate in such a way to insure reaching the steady state. In addition, we repeated 
each experiment 10 times and the results are averaged. The Maximum Requests Per 
Second (MRPS) threshold represents the number of requests permitted for a single user 
during a second. The MRPS threshold is set dependent on the cloud application. We 
assume a value of 4 for the MRPS in the simulation [43]. 
We assumed the use of a small VM instance that has a capability to handle 100 HTTP 
Req/sec as it was discussed by Catteddu and Daniele [100]. The number of initial running 
servers in the auto scaling group is 5 servers. The number of computing resources that 
will be added per provisioning process is 2 instances [64]. Virtual machines provisioning 
requires some time until they can provide their services to manage the cloud resources 
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[101], we used 55.4 second as the provisioning overhead caused by committing instances 
to the cloud service as was measured by Islam et al. [67]. Furthermore, the server 
response packet size is 580 bytes [102]. Liu and Wee [103] reported that an Amazon EC2 
instance can handle 800 Mbps when used as a load balancer. Therefore, we use Amazon's 
Elastic Load Balancer (ELB) with 5.8 µs, (580 × 8) (800 × 106)⁄ , service time.  
The average CPU utilization metric has been used for auto scaling and activating our 
mitigation technique purposes in the cloud services. We assumed the scaling-up upper 
and lower thresholds to be 80% and 75% respectively, whereas the scaling-down upper 
and lower thresholds are set to 35% and 30% respectively. The duration of the upper 
threshold timer is set to 5 minutes, while 1 minute has been assumed as the duration of 
the lower threshold timer. The aforementioned parameters are set based on [63, 64, 79]. 
The Attack Period Time (APT) has been set to 30 minute, where 80% of the attacks last 
less than this time in the considered set [70].  
The cost of a VM instance (𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑉𝑀) is set to $0.115 per hour in EDoS-Shield work. 
This value will be used in our experiments for the comparison purpose with the EDoS-
Shield work, but $0.036 per hour is the current cost as it is recently reported in Amazon 
for small on-demand VM instances running on the Windows operating system. The price 
of the large on-demand VM instance, used by the LB and the EDoS-ADS, is $0.134 per 
hour. However, $0.48 per hour will be used as the price of the large on-demand VM 
instance to compare the cost with EDoS-Shield work [24]. According to the reported 
prices of Internet input and output data transfer of Amazon EC2, the bandwidth allocation 
cost is set to $0.01 per in/out GB. The cost parameters are set based on [104].  
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Table 3 Experiment Parameters 
Parameter Value Reference 
Auto scaling metric CPU usage [64] 
Scaling-up upper threshold 80% [64] 
Scaling-up lower threshold 75% [63] 
Scaling-down upper threshold 35% [63] 
Scaling-down lower threshold 30% [43] 
Upper threshold duration 5 min [64] 
Lower threshold duration 1 min [43] 
Cloud instance size Small [100] 
Cloud instance service rate 100 HTTP Req/sec [100] 
Cloud instance cost 0.115 $/hr [64] 
Initial running servers 5 [64] 
Auto scaling size 2 [64] 
Provisioning overhead 55.4 sec [67] 
Web server response packet size 580 byte [102] 
Load balancer service time 5.8 µs [103] 
Flash Timer 1 min [43] 
APT 30 min [70] 
MRPS 4 [43] 
Large instance cost 0.48 $/hr [64] 
Bandwidth allocation cost 0.01 $/GB [104] 
reCAPTCHA response time 13.06 sec [60] 
URL redirection overhead 0.63 sec [105] 
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We assumed that attackers cannot respond to the reCAPTCHA Turing test. Conversely, 
we have chosen 92% as the success rate of legitimate users to solve reCAPTCHA 
requests [59], this assumption mimics the real life where some legitimate users cannot 
solve the reCAPTCHA for some reasons. The average time required by legitimate users 
to solve reCAPTCHA Turing test is set to 13.06 seconds according to 1000 arbitrarily 
tested users [59].  The URL redirection overhead is set to 0.63 seconds [103]. 
 
4.4 Simulator Validation  
 
The simulation is validated by comparing obtained EDoS-Shield CloudSim simulation 
results with the EDoS-Shield results [64] for the cloud computing resources. We consider 
the legitimate users targeting the cloud service with 400 requests per second while the 
attackers targeting the cloud service with different attack rates ranging from 400 requests 
per second to 8000 requests per second to show the impact of the attack on the targeted 
cloud service. Each of the following subsections will compare the results obtained with 
the results presented in the EDoS-Shield work [64].   
The number of cloud VM instances that will be used in the simulation experiments 
depends on the effective arrival rate. Since the mitigation technique will not be used 
during the validation process, we need to ensure that the incoming traffic to the cloud 
resources will not use more than the scale-up upper threshold of the processing resources, 
ρ ≤ 0.80 where ρ can be calculated using Eq. (4.2). Hence, the number of required VM 
instances will be determined according to the following equation: 
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                                         𝑆required = ⌈1.25 × (λ𝑙 + λ𝑚) 𝜇⁄ + 1⌉                               (4.9) 
Where λ𝑙 is the rate of legitimate traffic which was assumed as 400 Req/sec, λ𝑚 is the 
EDoS attack rate targeting the cloud service, 𝜇 is the service rate of the cloud server. 
Figure 18 shows the number of required VM instances, for different arrival rates, used in 
the simulation based on Eq. (4.9). 
The arrival rate will be distributed evenly among the cloud VM instances as shown in 
Figure 19. For example, if the legitimate users and malicious users target the cloud 
service with 400 Req/sec and 800 Req/sec respectively, the cloud service will be using 16 
VM instances based on Eq. (4.9) and each VM instance will have 75 Req/sec as an arrival 
rate. In addition, the arrival rate for each VM instance will follow a Poisson distribution 
as mentioned in EDoS-Shield work. 
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Figure 18 Number of Required VM Instances before Using the EDoS Mitigation Technique 
 
 
Figure 19 Queuing model for the Cloud Computing Resources [64] 
68 
 
4.4.1 Response Time 
 
The EDoS-Shield CloudSim simulation and the EDoS-Shield [64] have been compared in 
terms of the end-to-end response time as shown in Figure 20. It is clear that both 
simulations have similar results for the response time with small differences due to the 
randomness of the simulation. 
The results show that when the load increases, the corresponding end-to-end response 
time also increases. It is obvious that the response time does not go up considerably when 
the attack traffic significantly increases. This is due to the auto scaling mechanism that 
allocates more VM instances to process the high load caused by the attack traffic. 
However, the results in general show that the attack makes the legitimate clients suffer 
more response time compared to the optimal case where there is no attack targeting the 
cloud service and only legitimate users targeting the cloud service with 400 requests per 
second. 
Figure 21 shows the relative error percentage for the cloud computing resources response 
time. The Relative Error Percentage (REP) can be calculated as follows: 
                             𝑅𝐸𝑃 = |
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑠𝐸𝐷𝑜𝑆−𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑−𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑠𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑠𝐸𝐷𝑜𝑆−𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑
| × 100                          (4.10) 
The REP shows a good accuracy with an error of no more than 0.48% which corresponds 
to the maximum difference of 192.9 microseconds between the response time results of 
the EDoS-Shield CloudSim simulation and the EDoS-Shield [64]. 
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Figure 20 Response Time Results for EDoS-Shield and CloudSim Simulation 
 
 
Figure 21 Response Time REP of EDoS-Shield and CloudSim Simulation 
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4.4.2 Resources Utilization 
 
For the computing resources utilization, the outputs of both the EDoS-Shield CloudSim 
simulation and the EDoS-Shield [64] are identical as shown in Figure 22 with an error of 
no more than 0.075% between the CPU utilization results of the EDoS-Shield CloudSim 
simulation and the EDoS-Shield work as shown in Figure 23. 
The results show that the computing resources utilization has a similar trend to the end-
to-end response time in Figure 20, the CPU utilization increases whenever the attack rate 
increases. Thus, the EDoS attack consumes more computing resources when compared 
with the optimal case.  
 
 
Figure 22 Resources Utilization Results for EDoS-Shield and CloudSim Simulation 
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Figure 23 Resources Utilization REP of EDoS-Shield and CloudSim Simulation 
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5 CHAPTER 5 
SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, we present the simulation results for the proposed mitigation technique. 
We have conducted four experimental scenarios using the simulation model discussed in 
chapter 3 and chapter 4. In the first scenario, we study the normal mode in which we 
consider different arrival rates of legitimate clients with enough VM instances to allow 
the cloud computing system to handle the clients requests without the need for auto 
scaling. Such a scenario is highly needed to study if there is an overhead on the cloud 
computing service due to the use of the proposed mitigation technique. The second 
scenario is for the flash overcrowd mode where a high amount of traffic is coming 
toward the cloud service from the legitimate clients. This scenario will be used to study 
the performance of the EDoS Attack Defense Shell (EDoS-ADS) while triggering the 
auto scaling and the effect of these flash arrivals of requests on the measured parameters. 
In the third scenario, we have considered an attack mode where a fixed legitimate arrival 
rate and different attack rates targeting the cloud service are generated by clients that do 
not belong to NAT-based networks. Such a scenario will be conducted to study the 
effectiveness of the proposed mitigation technique under the attack mode and will 
demonstrate the efficiency of the Attack Shell in detecting attackers. The last scenario is 
similar to the previous attack scenario, but the legitimate and the malicious clients that 
request the cloud service belong to the same NAT-based network. This scenario is 
importantly considered because it is the typical real live scenario, and that it is more 
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serious than the previous scenario since both the legitimate and the malicious clients 
share the same NAT IP address. In addition, the results of the proposed mitigation 
technique are compared with the EDoS-Shield mitigation technique results [64]. 
 
5.1 Normal Mode Results  
 
In this scenario, we used different legitimate arrival rates ranging from 400 Req/sec to 
6400 Req/sec. The objective of this scenario is to find out if there is an overhead 
associated with the proposed mitigation technique even though the scenario does not 
consider any attack to the cloud services. In addition, the results of the proposed 
mitigation technique will be compared with the results of the EDoS-Shield mitigation 
technique (simulation case 1), the cloud computing system that uses of the auto scaling 
technique but without the use of an EDoS mitigation technique (simulation case 2), and 
the cloud computing system that uses neither the auto scaling technique nor the EDoS 
mitigation technique (simulation case 3). 
 
5.1.1 Required VM Instances 
 
We used different number of VM instances based on the arrival rates. The number of VM 
instances is selected in the same way that is used in the EDoS-Shield work [64] in order 
to compare the results and keep the CPU utilization below the auto scaling threshold. The 
EDoS-Shield work proposed the calculation of the required VM instances, as shown in 
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Eq. (4.9), to achieve less than 80% of CPU usage to examine the cloud system under the 
normal activity. Figure 24 shows the number of VM instances needed for different arrival 
rates. The results show that the required VM instances to handle the initial arrival rate, 
400 Req/sec, is 6. It should be noted that the number of VM instances are constant for 
simulation case 3 since it does not have the ability to auto scale. On the other hand, the 
proposed mitigation technique, simulation case 1, and simulation case 2 are using varied 
number of VM instances for different arrival rates that follow Eq. (4.9) because they have 
the auto scaling feature. 
 
 
Figure 24 Number of Required VM Instances in the Normal Mode 
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5.1.2 Response Time 
 
The average end-to-end response time along with the simulation time for our proposed 
technique at an arrival rate of 400 Req/sec with the use of 6 VM instances is shown in 
Figure 25. As shown, the average response time changes during the simulation until it 
reaches the steady state value of around 19 milliseconds. 
On the other hand, the response time of the cloud computing system under simulation 
case 3 is depicted in Figure 26 and Figure 27. It is clear that the average end-to-end 
response time became extremely high in less than 3.5 minutes from the start of 
submitting requests to the cloud. Such a case will cause a Denial of Service (DoS) for all 
clients requesting the cloud service which makes the cloud system unavailable. In 
addition, the average response time increases exponentially with increasing arrival rate. 
This is due to the fact that the number of cloud VM instances is fixed, and that the 
requests will wait for a long time in the cloud VMs until they are serviced. 
The end-to-end response time results for simulation case 2 have the same results as those 
obtained when using the EDoS Attack Defense Shell (EDoS-ADS) as shown in Figure 
28. The results are identical because no overhead and no extra processing are required by 
the EDoS-ADS since the load balancer will forward all incoming requests directly to the 
cloud servers during this mode. 
On the other hand, the simulation case 1end-to-end response time pertaining to the EDoS-
Shield is higher than that for our proposed mitigation technique as depicted in Figure 28. 
This difference is related to the extra overhead on the firewall of the EDoS-Shield that is 
associated with the checking of the IP addresses of the incoming requests. Moreover, the 
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authors of the EDoS-Shield work mentioned that the load balancer will distribute the 
clients requests on the cloud servers using a Round Robin mechanism and the inter 
arrival time of the incoming requests to the cloud load balancer is considered an 
exponential distribution. However, they actually assumed an exponential distribution for 
the inter arrival time of the clients requests on the cloud VM instances rather than on the 
cloud load balancer. Such a hypothesis is not valid as stated in [74-84] since it will make 
each VM instance in their simulation as a distinct cloud service. 
On the other hand, the end-to-end response time results in our simulation have a similar 
trend to the end-to-end response time in the EDoS-Shield simulation. That is, when the 
load increases, the corresponding end-to-end response time also increases. The response 
time does not go up considerably when the arrival traffic significantly increases due to 
the allocation of more VM instances to process the high load.  
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Figure 25 Response Time Evaluation for the EDoS Attack Defense Shell Simulation at Rate of 0.4 KReq/sec in 
the Normal Mode 
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Figure 26 Response Time Evaluation for the Simulation without Auto Scaling and Mitigation Technique 
(Simulation Case 3) at Rates of 0.8, 1.6, 2.4, and 3.2 KReq/sec in the Normal Mode 
 
Figure 27 Response Time Evaluation for the Simulation Without Auto Scaling and Mitigation Technique 
(Simulation Case 3) at Rates of  4, 4.8, 5.6, and 6.4 KReq/sec in the Normal Mode 
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Figure 28 Response Time Evaluation in the Normal Mode 
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5.1.3 Resources Utilization 
 
Figure 29 shows the average resources utilization for the EDoS Attack Defense Shell 
(EDoS-ADS) during the simulation time at rates of 400, 1600, and 6400 Req/sec under 
the normal mode. Obviously, the average CPU utilization will change a lot during the 
first period of the simulation and after that it will reach the steady state when targeting 
the cloud service with a high number of requests. 
Figure 30 compares the resources utilization of the EDoS-ADS against the three 
simulation cases for different arrival rates. The resources utilization results of the EDoS-
ADS and the simulation case 2 are identical because no overhead and no extra processing 
will be incurred as a result of the EDoS-ADS since it will not be used in such a case.  
Moreover, the results of both the EDoS-Shield simulation and the EDoS-ADS simulation 
are also identical as shown in Figure 30. The reason for having the same results for the 
resources utilization while having widely different results for the response time is due to 
the fact that each cloud VM instance receives equal amount of requests in both mitigation 
technique while the requests inter arrival time for each technique is different. The number 
of requests served by each used VM instance after 5 minutes of simulation at rates of 400 
Req/sec and 800 Req/sec is shown in Figure 31 and Figure 32, respectively. Note that the 
increase in the number of served requests for simulation case 3 in Figure 32 is due to the 
limitation of a maximum of 6 VM instances for that case which makes these VM 
instances running at a 100% utilization rate. 
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Figure 29 Resources Utilization Evaluation for the EDoS Attack Defense Shell Simulation at Rates of 0.4, 1.6, 
and 6.4 KReq/sec in the Normal Mode 
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Figure 30 Resources Utilization Evaluation in the Normal Mode 
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Figure 31 Number of Requests Served in each VM Instance after 5 Minutes of Simulation at Rate of 400 Req/sec 
 
Figure 32 Number of Requests Served in each VM Instance after 5 Minutes of Simulation at Rate of 800 Req/sec 
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5.1.4 Throughput 
 
The throughput evaluation in the normal mode for different arrival rates is shown in 
Figure 33. The throughput results are identical for the EDoS Attack Defense Shell 
(EDoS-ADS) and simulation case 1 and 2 for all considered arrival rates. This is due to 
having enough on-demand VM instances in the cloud service. In addition, the results 
show that the EDoS-ADS and simulation case 1 and 2 do not have an impact on the 
throughput rate. 
On the other hand, the throughput of the cloud computing system under simulation case 3 
has different trend when compared with the rest. This is because it has a fixed number of 
allocated VM instances. Subsequently, it will not be able to serve the incoming requests 
rate directly, and will result in a limited throughput rate. 
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Figure 33 Throughput Evaluation in the Normal Mode 
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5.1.5 Cost 
 
In this work, we follow the on-demand pricing model focusing on the costs that are 
related to the computing resources and network traffic volume [99]. In such a way, a 
cloud customer will pay for both bandwidth and computation usage. The cost has been 
calculated as shown in Eq. (4.8). 
Figure 34 shows the cost evaluation for the EDoS Attack Defense Shell (EDoS-ADS) 
compared with the three simulation cases for different arrival rates. We considered the 
cost per month for both of bandwidth allocation and the allocated VM instances. 
The costs are identical for the EDoS-ADS and simulation case 1 and 2 since they are all 
using the same number of VM instances and the average CPU utilization of the cloud 
computing system is also the same. 
On the other hand, the cost of the cloud computing system for simulation case 3 has a 
different trend when compared with the rest since it has a fixed number of allocated VM 
instances. Subsequently, the maximum cost in such a system will be the cost of running 
the available VM instances at full utilization.  
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Figure 34 Cost Evaluation in the Normal Mode 
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5.2 Flash Overcrowd Mode Results  
 
The flash overcrowd mode will occur when there is a large amount of legitimate traffic 
referred to as flash traffic that is targeting the cloud computing service. Recall from 
chapter 3 that the cloud system will be in the suspicion mode if the average CPU 
utilization exceeds the scaling-up upper threshold. Subsequently, the load balancer will 
redirect all incoming requests to the Suspicion Shell for differentiating between 
legitimate users and automated attackers as discussed in chapter 3. 
In this scenario, we used different legitimate arrival rates ranging from 400 Req/sec to 
6400 Req/sec. The legitimate clients are assumed to target the cloud computing service 
with CRPS less than the MRPS. In addition, there are no attackers targeting the cloud 
computing service in this scenario. For every arrival rate, the number of initial running 
VM instances is set to 5 VM instances. If the arrival rate is considered as flash traffic, the 
Suspicion Shell will request the allocation of 2 more VM instances to be added to the 
cloud computing service. 
The objective of this scenario is to find out if there is an overhead associated with the 
proposed mitigation technique even though the scenario does not consider any attack to 
the cloud services. Moreover, this scenario will show the capability of the proposed 
mitigation technique to auto scale when having flash traffic. In addition, the results of the 
proposed mitigation technique will be compared with the results of the EDoS-Shield 
mitigation technique (simulation case 1), and the cloud computing system that uses of the 
auto scaling technique but without the use of an EDoS mitigation technique (simulation 
case 2). 
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5.2.1 Resources Utilization and Number of Allocated VM Instances 
 
The Suspicion Shell will allocate new VM instances to the cloud computing service 
when there is a high amount of traffic coming from legitimate clients. The simulation 
case 2 follows the same setup mentioned in the EDoS-Shield work in which the CPU 
utilization will be checked periodically every 5 minutes. Subsequently, an additional 2 
VM instances will be allocated after 55.4 seconds, referred to as the provisioning 
overhead, if the CPU utilization exceeds the 80%. The resources utilization and the 
number of allocated VM instances for the simulation case 2, and the EDoS Attack 
Defense Shell (EDoS-ADS) at rates of 0.4, 0.8, 1.6, 2.4, and 3.2 KReq/sec are shown in 
APPENDIX A. It is clear that the simulations of both cases have been allocated the same 
number of VM instances. However, the EDoS-ADS mitigation technique is faster in the 
allocation of these VM instances since it makes use of the clients collected information in 
the database. Subsequently, it changes the cloud mode to the flash overcrowd mode and 
allocates new VM instances to the cloud computing service accordingly. 
We have conducted a simulation experiment similar to that presented in the EDoS-Shield 
work to evaluate the auto scaling mechanism in each technique as shown in Figure 35. 
The EDoS-Shield work assumed that the arrival rate is 200 Req/sec during the first 25 
minutes of the simulation with the use of 5 VM instances as an initial VM instances in 
the cloud service. Subsequently, the arrival rate increases until it reaches 2400 Req/sec. 
Note that the results shown in the EDoS-Shield work reflect an ideal case where the 
newly allocated VM instances service the queued requests instantaneously. Therefore, 
these results match the analytical model, and can be considered, at best, optimal. The side 
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effect of this on the EDoS-Shield is extremely high response time. The results show that 
the EDoS-ADS allocates 12 more VM instances compared with the optimal number of 
VM instances that needed to be allocated. However, the EDoS-ADS allocates the 
required VM instances with half of the time used to allocate the VM instances in the 
optimal case. 
Figure 36 shows the comparison of the number of allocated VM instances for the 
simulation case 2, the EDoS-ADS, and the optimal case while considering different 
legitimate arrival rates. Note that the optimal case allocates the required number of VM 
instances analytically according to Eq. (4.9). Figure 37 shows the evaluation of the time 
to allocate the required number of VM instances until the CPU utilization becomes less 
than 80%. It is clear that our mitigation technique has reached the desired number of VM 
instances with less time when compared with the other techniques. This is due to the fast 
detection of such a flash overcrowd mode. 
Finally, the evaluation of the resources CPU utilization in the flash overcrowd mode for 
different arrival rates is shown in Figure 38. The CPU utilization results are identical for 
the simulation case 2 and the EDoS-ADS. This is because both of the techniques are 
using the same number of VM instances for serving the legitimate clients requests during 
the flash overcrowd mode. However, the CPU utilization when using the EDoS-Shield is 
greater than the CPU utilization when using the EDoS-ADS since the EDoS-Shield uses 
less number of VM instances than the EDoS-ADS. 
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Figure 35 Evaluation of the Number of Allocated VM Instances at Rate of 2.4 KReq/sec in the Flash Overcrowd 
Mode 
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Figure 36 Evaluation of the Number of Allocated VM Instances 
 
Figure 37 Evaluation of the Time to Allocate the Required Number of VM Instances 
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Figure 38 Resources Utilization Evaluation in the Flash Overcrowd Mode 
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5.2.2 Response Time 
 
The time average end-to-end response time evaluation for the simulation case 2, and the 
EDoS Attack Defense Shell (EDoS-ADS) at rates of 0.4, 0.8, 1.6, 2.4, and 3.2 KReq/sec 
are shown in APPENDIX B. It is clear that the EDoS-ADS simulation has less average 
response time when compared with the average response time of simulation case 2. This 
is because of the faster allocation of new VM instances in the case of the EDoS-ADS. 
The evaluation of the average response time in the flash overcrowd mode for different 
arrival rates and for different simulation cases is shown in Figure 39 and Figure 40. For 
all simulation cases considered, the response time does not go up considerably when the 
arrival traffic significantly increases. This is mainly due to the auto scaling mechanism 
that allocates sufficient VM instances to process the additional load. The response time 
results are almost identical for simulation case 2 and the EDoS-ADS simulation. This is 
due to that both of the techniques are using the same number of VM instances for serving 
the legitimate clients requests during the flash overcrowd mode. Note that the average 
processing time of the large VM instances used for the EDoS-ADS does not add 
significantly to the response time since it is extremely low, around 6 microseconds for the 
rate of 6.4 KReq/sec. However, the response time when using the EDoS-Shield is greater 
than the response time when using the EDoS-ADS due to the different number of VM 
instances allocated to the cloud service. Note that the less number of VM instances in the 
EDoS-Shield results in large queuing delay which in turns results in higher response time. 
In addition, the EDoS-Shield has a much higher response time than the EDoS-ADS due 
to the extra overhead on the firewall of the EDoS-Shield that is associated with the 
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checking of the IP addresses of the incoming requests, and the EDoS-Shield assumption 
of an exponential distribution for the inter arrival time of the clients requests on the cloud 
VM instances rather than on the cloud load balancer.  
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Figure 39 Response Time Evaluation in the Flash Overcrowd Mode 
 
Figure 40 Response Time Evaluation for EDoS Attack Defense Shell in the Flash Overcrowd Mode 
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5.2.3 Throughput 
 
The throughput evaluation for the simulation case 2, and the EDoS Attack Defense Shell 
(EDoS-ADS) at rates of 0.4, 0.8, 1.6, 2.4, and 3.2 KReq/sec are shown in APPENDIX C. 
It is clear that the EDoS-ADS simulation has more throughputs when compared to 
simulation case 2. This is due to the faster allocation of new VM instances in the case of 
the EDoS-ADS. 
Figure 41 shows the throughput evaluation in the flash overcrowd mode for different 
arrival rates and for different simulation cases. The throughput of the cloud computing 
system is the same for all simulation cases considered due to the elasticity nature of the 
cloud computing system in which VM instances being allocated as needed. 
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Figure 41 Throughput Evaluation in the Flash Overcrowd Mode 
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5.2.4 Cost 
 
The cost is computed according to Eq. (4.8). In such a way, a cloud customer will pay for 
both bandwidth and computation usage. Figure 42 shows the cost evaluation for the 
EDoS Attack Defense Shell (EDoS-ADS) compared with the other techniques in the 
flash overcrowd mode for different arrival rates. We considered the cost of the bandwidth 
allocation and the allocated VM instances for 10 hours [24]. 
The costs are identical for the cloud computing system for simulation case 2 and the 
EDoS-ADS. This is because they allocate the same number of VM instances and the 
average CPU utilization of the cloud computing system is also the same for these 
techniques. Note that the cost of the EDoS-ADS large VM instance is extremely low 
since its CPU utilization is less than 1%. Therefore, the cost of the EDoS-ADS is not 
affected by the large cost of the large VM instance. Moreover, the cost for the EDoS-
Shield is almost identical for the cost of the EDoS-ADS even when it allocates less VM 
instances when compared with the VM instances allocated in the EDoS-ADS. This is 
because the average CPU utilization in the EDoS-Shield VM instances is greater than that 
of the EDoS-ADS. 
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Figure 42 Cost Evaluation in the Flash Overcrowd Mode 
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5.2.5 reCAPTCHA Turing Test 
 
The Maximum Requests Per Second (MRPS) greatly influences the amount of 
reCAPTCHA testing required from a client. Subsequently, if the legitimate clients seek to 
target the cloud service with Concurrent Requests Per Second (CRPS) greater than the 
MRPS during the flash overcrowd mode, they will be asked to increment their TF level 
in order to avoid receiving additional reCAPTCHA Turing test. Such clients can achieve 
higher TF level by successfully answering the reCAPTCHA Turing tests as shown in 
Figure 12 until they reach the good TF level. Figure 43 shows the number of required 
reCAPTCHA Turing tests considering different values for both the MRPS and CRPS 
before reaching a good TF level. The results show that the legitimate clients will be 
requested to answer 5 reCAPTCHA Turing tests in average when their CRPS is larger 
than the MRPS. On the other hand, the requests of clients requesting the cloud service 
with CRPS less than or equal to MRPS will be forwarded to the cloud servers 
immediately without requesting those clients to answer the reCAPTCHA Turing tests. 
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Figure 43 reCAPTCHA Turing Test Evaluation in the Flash Overcrowd Mode 
  
103 
 
5.3 Attack Mode Results - Legitimate Clients and Attackers do not 
belong to NAT-based Networks 
 
In this scenario, we consider having legitimate clients and attackers targeting the cloud 
resources to evaluate the proposed mitigation technique under the EDoS attack. The 
system will start working in the suspicion mode when the current system utilization 
exceeds the scaling-up upper threshold. In this case, the cloud service load balancer will 
redirect all incoming requests to the EDoS Attack Defense Shell for a validation period. 
In this validation period, the Suspicion Shell will send a reCAPTCHA and URL 
redirection packets to the clients to differentiate between the flash overcrowd mode and 
the attack mode as explained in chapter 3. Upon detection of an attack behavior, the 
cloud system mode is changed to an attack mode and all incoming requests will be 
redirected to the Attack Shell. 
This scenario assumes that the legitimate clients and attackers do not belong to NAT-
based networks. Thus, the IP addresses for the legitimate clients and attackers will be 
dissimilar. We used different attack rates ranging from 400 to 6000 Req/sec to evaluate 
the proposed mitigation technique under the EDoS attack. However, the legitimate arrival 
rate is assumed to be fixed with a rate of 400 Req/sec, and each legitimate client 
transmits at a rate less than MRPS. We compare the EDoS Attack Defense Shell results 
with the results of the EDoS-Shield mitigation technique (simulation case 1), and the 
cloud computing system that uses of the auto scaling technique but without the use of an 
EDoS mitigation technique (simulation case 2). For every attack rate, the number of 
initial running VM instances is set to 7, 6 and 7 VM instances for the EDoS-ADS, the 
104 
 
simulation case 1, and the simulation case 2, respectively, according to the results 
obtained previously in subsection ‎5.1.2 
The EDoS-Shield mitigation technique will be vulnerable to IP address spoofing problem 
in such a scenario. So, we consider three cases for the EDoS-Shield mitigation technique, 
these cases are the EDoS-Shield optimal case, the EDoS-Shield whitelist case, and the 
EDoS-Shield blacklist case. The EDoS-Shield optimal case refers to the case when there 
is no spoofing of IP addresses. Thus, all legitimate clients’ IP addresses are in the 
whitelist and all attackers’ IP addresses are in the blacklist. The EDoS-Shield whitelist 
case refers to when the attackers spoof IP addresses that are already in the whitelist. 
Therefore, the EDoS-Shield will consider these attackers as legitimate clients. 
Subsequently, their traffic will access the cloud computing service. Finally, the EDoS-
Shield blacklist case is used to describe the EDoS-Shield when the attackers carry out an 
attack using spoof IP addresses that are currently neither in the whitelist nor in the 
blacklist. Considering that these spoofed IP addresses were not used before to access the 
cloud services, these spoofed IP addresses will be added to the blacklist. Therefore, the 
EDoS-Shield will consider the legitimate clients with the same IP addresses as attackers. 
Subsequently, the legitimate clients will not be able to access the cloud service because 
their IP addresses are already in the blacklist.  
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5.3.1 Resources Utilization and Number of Allocated VM Instances 
 
Figure 44 shows the comparison of the number of allocated VM instances for the 
simulation case 1, the simulation case 2, and the EDoS Attack Defense Shell (EDoS-
ADS) while considering different attack arrival rates. It is clear that both of the 
simulation case 2 and the simulation case 1 (whitelist case) have been allocated higher 
number of VM instances compared to the others because they are considering the attack 
traffic as flash traffic. As a result, both of the simulation case 2 and the simulation case 1 
(whitelist case) will auto scale to serve the incoming flash traffic as discussed in 
subsection ‎5.2.1. On the other hand, the simulation case 1 (optimal case) has used the 
initial number of VM instances in order to serve the legitimate traffic according to EDoS-
Shield analytical model. Similarly, the simulation case 1 (blacklist case) has used the 
initial number of VM instances for all of the considered attack rates, and did not perform 
auto-scaling. This is because both of the legitimate clients and attackers were unable to 
access the cloud service since their IP addresses are already in the blacklist. Finally, the 
EDoS-ADS has used the initial number of VM instances for both cases where we 
consider the attack requests and where we ignore those requests originated by attackers. 
Thus, the proposed EDoS-ADS will completely eliminate the EDoS attack. 
The evaluation of the resources CPU utilization in the attack mode for different attack 
arrival rates is shown in Figure 45. The CPU utilization results are identical for the case 
when the EDoS-ADS only considers the legitimate traffic and the case when the EDoS-
ADS considering both legitimate and attack traffic. This is because both cases are using 
the same number of VM instances for serving the legitimate clients requests during the 
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attack mode. However, the CPU utilization when using the simulation case 1 (optimal 
case) is greater than the CPU utilization when using the EDoS-ADS since the simulation 
case 1 (optimal case) uses less number of VM instances than the EDoS-ADS.  
Note that based on Figure 44 the simulation case 1 (whitelist case) has been allocated 
more VM instances than the EDoS-ADS as a result of the attack traffic. The simulation 
case 1 (whitelist case) considers the attack traffic as flash traffic. Subsequently, the attack 
traffic will be served by the cloud VM instances in such scenario. Hence, the CPU 
utilization when using the simulation case 1 (whitelist case) is higher than the CPU 
utilization when using the EDoS-ADS as evident from Figure 45. In contrast, in the 
simulation case 2 more VM instances are allocated than the simulation case 1 (whitelist 
case) that result in lowering the CPU utilization to be almost identical to the CPU 
utilization of the EDoS-ADS. 
It should be noted that the CPU utilization when using the simulation case 1 (blacklist 
case) is zero because the legitimate clients requests are dropped since their IP addresses 
are already in the blacklist. 
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Figure 44 Evaluation of the Number of Allocated VM Instances in the Attack Mode with the Use of Different 
NAT-based Networks 
 
Figure 45 Resources Utilization Evaluation in the Attack Mode with the Use of Different NAT-based Networks 
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5.3.2 Response Time 
 
The evaluation of the average response time in the attack mode for different attack arrival 
rates and for different simulation cases is shown in Figure 46. The response time results 
are constant for the simulation case 1 (optimal case), the case when the EDoS Attack 
Defense Shell (EDoS-ADS) only considers the legitimate traffic, and the case when the 
EDoS-ADS considers both legitimate and attack traffic. This means that these techniques 
have successfully eliminated the attackers’ requests by dropping them; the legitimate 
users have not been affected by the malicious traffic. However, the response time when 
using the simulation case 1 (optimal case) is greater than the response time when using 
the EDoS-ADS due to the different number of VM instances allocated to the cloud 
service. As explained in subsection ‎5.1.2, the less number of VM instances in the 
simulation case 1 (optimal case) results in large queuing delay which in turn results in 
higher response time. In addition, the simulation case 1 (optimal case) has a much higher 
response time than the EDoS-ADS due to the simulation case 1 assumption of an 
exponential distribution for the inter arrival time of the clients requests on the cloud VM 
instances rather than on the cloud load balancer.   
For the simulation case 1 (whitelist case) and simulation case 2, the response time 
increases when the attack traffic significantly increases but it does not go up 
considerably. This is mainly due to the auto scaling mechanism that allocates sufficient 
VM instances to process the additional load since both of these simulations consider the 
attack traffic as flash traffic. Note that based on Figure 44 the simulation case 1 (whitelist 
case) has been allocated more VM instances than the EDoS-ADS as a result of the attack 
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traffic. However, the simulation case 1 (whitelist case) assumes an exponential 
distribution for the inter arrival time of the clients requests on the cloud VM instances 
rather than on the cloud load balancer. Hence, the response time when using the 
simulation case 1 (whitelist case) is higher than the response time when using the EDoS-
ADS as evident from Figure 46. In contrast, in the simulation case 2 more VM instances 
are allocated than the simulation case 1 (whitelist case) that results in lowering the 
response time to be slightly lower than the response time of the EDoS-ADS. 
Note that the response time is zero when using the simulation case 1 (blacklist case) 
because all of the requests are dropped due to having the legitimate clients IP addresses 
in the blacklist. 
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Figure 46 Response Time Evaluation in the Attack Mode with the Use of Different NAT-based Networks 
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5.3.3 Throughput 
 
The throughput evaluation of the legitimate requests in the attack mode for different 
attack arrival rates is shown in Figure 47. The throughput results are identical for the 
EDoS Attack Defense Shell (EDoS-ADS) and the simulation case 2 for all considered 
attack arrival rates. This is due to having enough on-demand VM instances in the cloud 
service. In addition, the results show that the throughput of the legitimate requests was 
not affected by the attack arrival rate when using either the EDoS-ADS or the simulation 
case 2. 
On the other hand, the results show slightly noticeable degradation in the throughput of 
the cloud computing system under simulation case 1 (optimal and whitelist cases) as 
reported in [64]. Finally, when using the simulation case 1 (blacklist case), there is no 
throughput rate to the legitimate requests because all of these requests have been dropped 
by the virtual firewall. 
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Figure 47 Throughput Evaluation of Legitimate Requests in the Attack Mode with the Use of Different NAT-
based Networks 
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5.3.4 Cost 
 
Figure 48 shows the cost evaluation for the EDoS Attack Defense Shell (EDoS-ADS) 
compared with the other techniques in the attack mode for different attack arrival rates. 
We considered the cost of the bandwidth allocation and the allocated VM instances 
assuming that the attack lasts for 10 hours [24]. The cost is calculated according to Eq. 
(4.8). 
The costs are almost identical for the case when the EDoS-ADS only considers the 
legitimate traffic and the case when the EDoS-ADS considers both legitimate and attack 
traffic. This is because they allocate the same number of VM instances and the average 
CPU utilization of the cloud computing system is also the same in both cases as 
demonstrated in subsection ‎5.3.1. Moreover, the cost for the simulation case 1 (optimal 
case) is almost identical to the cost of the EDoS-ADS even though it allocates less VM 
instances when compared with the VM instances allocated in the EDoS-ADS. This is 
because the average CPU utilization in the simulation case 1 (optimal case) is greater 
than that of the EDoS-ADS. 
On the other hand, the costs for the simulation case 1 (whitelist case) and the simulation 
case 2 are greater than the cost of the EDoS-ADS. This is because they have been 
allocated higher number of VM instances compared to the allocated VM instances for the 
EDoS-ADS since they consider the attack traffic as flash traffic. Note that the cost for the 
simulation case 1 (blacklist case) is almost zero because the average CPU utilization in 
the simulation case 1 (blacklist case) is zero too. 
  
114 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 48 Cost Evaluation in the Attack Mode with the Use of Different NAT-based Networks 
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5.4 Attack Mode Results - Legitimate Users and Attackers belong to 
the Same NAT-based Network 
 
In this scenario, we consider having legitimate clients and attackers targeting the cloud 
resources to evaluate the proposed mitigation technique under the EDoS attack. The 
system will start working in the suspicion mode when the current system utilization 
exceeds the scaling-up upper threshold. In this case, the cloud service load balancer will 
redirect all incoming requests to the EDoS Attack Defense Shell for a validation period. 
In this validation period, the Suspicion Shell will send a reCAPTCHA and URL 
redirection packets to the clients to differentiate between the flash overcrowd mode and 
the attack mode as explained in chapter 3. Upon detection of an attack behavior, the 
cloud system mode is changed to an attack mode and all incoming requests will be 
redirected to the Attack Shell. 
This scenario assumes that the legitimate clients and attackers belong to the same NAT-
based network. Thus, the IP addresses for the legitimate clients and attackers will appear 
to the cloud service to be the same and equal to the public IP address of the NAT router. 
This scenario is importantly considered because it is the typical real live scenario, and 
that it is more serious than the previous scenario since both the legitimate and the 
malicious clients share the same NAT public IP address. 
The EDoS-Shield mitigation technique will be vulnerable to block an entire NAT-based 
network due to an EDoS attack by attackers that belong to the NAT-based network. So, 
we consider two cases for the EDoS-Shield mitigation technique; the EDoS-Shield 
whitelist case, and the EDoS-Shield blacklist case. The EDoS-Shield whitelist case refers 
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to when the NAT public IP address is already in the whitelist. Therefore, the EDoS-
Shield will consider the attackers that belong to the NAT-based network as legitimate 
clients and it will allow them to access the cloud service. The EDoS-Shield blacklist case 
is used to describe the case when the NAT public IP address was not used before to 
access the cloud service. Subsequently, the NAT public IP address was used by an EDoS 
attacker that belongs to the NAT-based network. Hence, the NAT public IP address will 
be added to the blacklist. Therefore, the EDoS-Shield will consider the legitimate clients 
that belong to the NAT-based network as attackers. Subsequently, the legitimate clients 
will not be able to access the cloud service because, from the cloud service point of view, 
their IP addresses are already in the blacklist. Note that the results for the EDoS-Shield 
work in this scenario are exactly the same as the results that were shown in the previous 
attack scenario demonstrated in subsection ‎5.3. 
In this scenario, we generated a fixed load representing the legitimate traffic that 
consumes about 40% of the resources CPU utilization [106]. The arrival rate to the cloud 
computing environment is divided into five groups as shown in Table 4. The first group 
represents the legitimate clients targeting the cloud resources with requests less than what 
is allowed by the system (< MRPS). The second group denotes 20 legitimate clients 
transmit at a rate more than MRPS. The third, fourth, and fifth groups are for attackers 
sending requests less than what is allowed by the system, equal to that allowed by the 
system, and more than what is allowed by the system, respectively. These groups were 
chosen to study the behavior of the proposed mitigation technique when dealing with the 
various arrival rates of legitimate and malicious requests. 
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Table 4 Clients Targeting the Cloud Services in the Attack Mode with the Use of the Same NAT-based Network  
Set ID Type Specifications Number of Clients 
1 Legitimate Sends less requests than allowed by 
the system (CRPS = 1 < MRPS)  
100 
2 Legitimate Sends more requests than allowed by 
the system (CRPS = 5 > MRPS) 
20 
3 Malicious Sends less requests than allowed by 
the system (CRPS = 1 < MRPS) 
100 
4 Malicious Sends requests equal to that allowed 
by the system (CRPS = 4 = MRPS) 
25 
5 Malicious Sends more requests than allowed by 
the system (CRPS = 10 > MRPS) 
10 
 
The legitimate arrival rate is set to 200 Req/sec during the simulation with the use of 5 
VM instances as an initial VM instances in the cloud service. The attack traffic is 
assumed to start after one minute of the simulation. We compare the EDoS Attack 
Defense Shell results with the results of the cloud system that uses of the auto scaling 
technique but without the use of an EDoS mitigation technique (simulation case 2). 
 
5.4.1 Resources Utilization and Number of Allocated VM Instances 
 
Figure 49 shows the comparison of the number of allocated VM instances for the 
simulation case 2, and the EDoS Attack Defense Shell (EDoS-ADS) during the 
simulation time. It is clear that the simulation case 2 has been allocated 2 additional VM 
instances compared to the EDoS-ADS because it is considering the attack traffic as 
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regular traffic. As a result, the simulation case 2 will auto scale to serve the incoming 
traffic as discussed in subsection ‎5.2.1. On the other hand, the EDoS-ADS has properly 
identified the EDoS attack traffic as such. Accordingly, the EDoS-ADS drops that traffic, 
and prevents it from reaching the cloud servers. Subsequently, only the initially allocated 
VM instances are used to serve the legitimate incoming requests, and the EDoS-ADS 
does not perform auto-scaling. Thus, the proposed EDoS-ADS completely eliminates the 
EDoS attack. 
The evaluation of the resources CPU utilization is shown in Figure 50. It is clear that the 
CPU utilization of the cloud servers fluctuates around 40% during the first minute of the 
simulation for both of the simulation case 2 and the EDoS-ADS. Note that during the first 
minute only the legitimate traffic is received by the cloud system, and the 40% CPU 
utilization represents the CPU usage for serving that traffic. Then, the resources CPU 
utilization immediately jumped to be around 100% for both techniques as soon as the 
attack began. Around minute 6, the CPU utilization for simulation case 2 returns to about 
72% when the cloud system performed auto-scaling.  
The cloud mode for the EDoS-ADS has been changed from the normal mode to the 
suspicion mode after one minute from the beginning of the simulation since the current 
system utilization exceeds the scaling-up upper threshold as shown in Figure 51. At this 
time, the cloud service load balancer redirects all incoming requests to the Suspicion 
Shell. Subsequently, the Suspicion Shell sends a reCAPTCHA and URL redirection 
packets to the clients to differentiate between the flash overcrowd mode and the attack 
mode as explained in chapter 3. Then, the cloud system mode is directly changed to the 
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attack mode due to the fast detection of the EDoS attack. Subsequently, all incoming 
requests have been redirected to the Attack Shell. 
Accordingly, in Figure 50, during the attack mode (between minutes one and two), the 
second group of legitimate clients have been asked to answer the reCAPTCHA Turing 
test since their requests rate is greater than what is allowed by the system. These clients 
are delayed by 13.06 seconds on average to solve the reCAPTCHA Turing test. 
Accordingly, the traffic coming from the second group does not immediately reach the 
VM instances. Subsequently, the resources CPU utilization suddenly drops to about 20% 
which is associated with the CPU usage for serving the first legitimate group requests 
only. The two spikes between minutes one and two are due to the additional traffic 
contributed by the second legitimate group. The amount of additional traffic is 80 
Req/sec (4 Req/sec × 20 clients without additional reCAPTCHA Turing test). The drop in 
these two spikes is due to the fifth request within the same second from the second 
legitimate group which forces reCAPTCHA Turing test to be sent to such clients. 
After that (around minute two until the end of the simulation), the resources CPU 
utilization climbs to 40% because the arrival requests from the second group of legitimate 
clients becomes 5 Req/sec. This is because of the improvement of their TF due to 
answering the required number of reCAPTCHA Turing tests which ultimately leads to 
higher allowable requests per second for such clients. 
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Figure 49 Evaluation of the Number of Allocated VM Instances in the Attack Mode with the Use of the Same 
NAT-based Network for both the Legitimate Clients and the Attackers 
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Figure 50 Resources Utilization Evaluation in the Attack Mode with the Use of the Same NAT-based Network 
for both the Legitimate Clients and the Attackers 
 
 
Figure 51 Cloud Mode Evaluation in the Attack Mode with the Use of the Same NAT-based Network for both 
the Legitimate Clients and the Attackers 
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5.4.2 reCAPTCHA Turing Test 
 
The Suspicion Shell will send a reCAPTCHA Turing test to a client sending a new 
request to the cloud service, if the client’s CRPS is larger than the MRPS, and the TF is 
either average or bad. While, the Attack Shell will send reCAPTCHA Turing test for 
those clients targeting the cloud service using the virtual IP address but with a CRPS 
exceeding their Allowable-RPS threshold. The Turing test will help in allowing the 
legitimate users to improve their TF. The improvement of users TF results in an increase 
in their Allowable-RPS threshold and allows them to target the cloud service with higher 
requests rate without a need for reCAPTCHA tests in subsequent submission of requests. 
The Allowable-RPS threshold is calculated based on Eq. (3.1). 
Figure 52 shows the cumulative number of reCAPTCHA Turing tests sent to the 
legitimate clients. The requests from the first group of legitimate clients are forwarded to 
the cloud servers immediately without requesting those clients to answer the 
reCAPTCHA Turing tests. This is because they are requesting the cloud service with 
CRPS less than what is allowed by the system (CRPS < MRPS) during the suspicion 
mode. In addition, their CRPS does not exceed their Allowable-RPS threshold during the 
attack mode. 
On the other hand, the results show that the second group of legitimate clients is 
requested to answer 3 reCAPTCHA Turing tests on average. The second group of 
legitimate clients has been asked to answer the first reCAPTCHA Turing test during the 
suspicion mode since their requests rate is greater than what is allowed by the system. 
The fifth request within the same second from the second legitimate group forces 
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reCAPTCHA Turing test to be sent to such clients since the allowed MRPS is set to 4. 
Moreover, the second group of legitimate clients has been asked to answer the second 
and third reCAPTCHA Turing tests during the attack mode. This is because their CRPS 
is larger than their Allowable-RPS threshold.  
Note that the time difference between two consecutive reCAPTCHA Turing tests 
represents the response time overhead of answering the reCAPTCHA Turing tests. The 
legitimate clients of the second group are delayed by 13.06 seconds on average to solve 
the reCAPTCHA Turing test.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 52 reCAPTCHA Turing Test Evaluation in the Attack Mode with the Use of the Same NAT-based 
Network for both the Legitimate Clients and the Attackers 
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5.4.3 Response Time 
 
The evaluation of the response time for legitimate requests is shown in Figure 53 and 
Figure 54. The response time results for the simulation case 2 and the EDoS Attack 
Defense Shell (EDoS-ADS) are fluctuating around 12 milliseconds during the first 
minute of the simulation. However, the response time for the simulation case 2 increases 
when the attack traffic starts targeting the cloud service at which time the response time 
goes up considerably until it becomes 1.85 seconds. Almost at the beginning of the sixth 
minute of the simulation, the response time of legitimate requests for the simulation case 
2 returns to be around 24 milliseconds. This is mainly due to the auto scaling mechanism 
that allocates additional VM instances to process the additional load since the simulation 
case 2 considers the attack traffic as regular traffic.  
In Figure 53, during the second minute of the simulation, it is noticeable that the response 
time of the legitimate requests for the EDoS-ADS has three spikes due to the overhead of 
the reCAPTCHA Turing tests sent to the legitimate clients in the second group. After 
that, the response time for the EDoS-ADS returns similar to the state it was at before the 
start of the attack; around 12 milliseconds as clearly shown in the response time close up 
provided in Figure 54. Thus, the EDoS-ADS successfully eliminates affecting the 
legitimate traffic by the EDoS attack. 
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Figure 53 Response Time Evaluation in the Attack Mode with the Use of the Same NAT-based Network for both 
the Legitimate Clients and the Attackers 
 
Figure 54 A Close Look at Response Time Evaluation in the Attack Mode with the Use of the Same NAT-based 
Network for both the Legitimate Clients and the Attackers  
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5.4.4 Throughput 
 
The throughput evaluation of the legitimate requests during the simulation time is shown 
in Figure 55. The throughput results are identical for the EDoS Attack Defense Shell 
(EDoS-ADS) and the simulation case 2 during the first minute of the simulation. This is 
due to having enough on-demand VM instances in the cloud service. In addition, it is 
clear that the throughput of the legitimate requests for simulation case 2 oscillates around 
200 Req/sec during the simulation even after the beginning of the EDoS attack and before 
it allocates additional VM instances. This is mainly due to the ability to serve the 
legitimate and the attack traffic using the initial number of VM instances. 
For the EDoS-ADS, it can be noticed that the throughput of the legitimate requests 
suddenly drops to about 65 Req/sec once the load balancer starts redirecting the incoming 
requests to the EDoS-ADS. This is due to the small overhead of the URL redirection 
requests sent to the legitimate clients, and the delay associated with the response to the 
reCAPTCHA Turing test for the second group of legitimate clients, as mentioned in 
subsection ‎5.4.1. During the attack mode (between minutes one and two), the throughput 
returns to fluctuate around 100 Req/sec. This throughput is associated with the first 
legitimate group requests only. The two spikes between minutes one and two are due to 
the 100 Req/sec of the first legitimate group, and some of the requests originated from 
clients in the second legitimate group before violating the allowable requests rate 
according to their TF. After that (around minute two until the end of the simulation), the 
throughput climbs to 200 Req/sec because the arrival requests from each client in the 
second group of legitimate clients becomes 5 Req/sec. This is because of the 
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improvement of their TF due to answering the required number of reCAPTCHA Turing 
test. 
In summary, the overall throughput of the legitimate requests is not affected by the attack 
arrival rate when using either the EDoS-ADS or the simulation case 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 55 Throughput Evaluation of Legitimate Requests in the Attack Mode with the Use of the Same NAT-
based Network for both the Legitimate Clients and the Attackers 
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5.4.5 Trust Factor 
 
The Trust Factor (TF) is a value in the range of [0, 1] assigned to each client depending 
on the client’s response to the reCAPTCHA Turing test. The Suspicion Shell will send a 
reCAPTCHA Turing test to a client sending a new request to the cloud service, if the 
client’s CRPS is larger than the MRPS, and the TF is either average or bad. While, the 
Attack Shell will send reCAPTCHA Turing test for those clients targeting the cloud 
service using the virtual IP address but with a CRPS exceeding their Allowable-RPS 
threshold. A TF value close to 1 indicates a high trust factor and that the associated client 
is likely trust worthy. The TF value is initially set to 0.5 by the Suspicion Shell when a 
new request from a new client passes the EDoS Attack Defense Shell. The TF value is 
incremented or decremented according to the finite state machine shown in Figure 12 in 
subsection ‎3.3. 
Figure 56 and Figure 57 show the corresponding average TF value for the considered 
clients groups. It is noted that the TF values for clients at group 1, 3, and 4 are initially set 
to 0.5 by the Suspicion Shell and they did not change during the simulation. This is due 
to that these clients request with a CRPS less than or equal to the MRPS threshold during 
the suspicion mode, and their CRPS does not exceed their Allowable-RPS threshold 
during the attack mode.  
However, the average TF value for the legitimate clients in group 2 rises gradually from 
0.5 to 0.51, then from 0.51 to 0.53, and then from 0.53 to 0.57, after 74, 88, and 102 
seconds from the beginning of the simulation, respectively. The TF value of 0.57 allows 
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those clients to request the cloud service with CRPS equal to 5 requests per second 
according to Eq. (3.1). 
On the other hand, the average TF value for the third group of the malicious clients 
(CRPS = 10) falls substantially from 0.5 to 0.48, then from 0.48 to 0.45, then from 0.45 
to 0.39, then from 0.39 to 0.27, and then from 0.27 to 0.03, at second 61. The TF value 
has been dropped from the average TF level to the bad TF level just within one second 
because those clients do not wait for the response of the cloud system, and they do not 
provide an answer to the reCAPTCHA Turing test sent to them. It should be noted that 
receiving of an HTTP web page request while waiting for an answer to the reCAPTCHA 
Turing test is counted as a failure in solving the Turing test. Subsequently, the TF value 
will be decremented according to Figure 12 in subsection ‎3.3. 
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Figure 56 Trust Factor Evaluation in the Attack Mode with the Use of the Same NAT-based Network for both 
the Legitimate Clients and the Attackers 
 
Figure 57 A Close Look at Trust Factor Evaluation in the Attack Mode with the Use of the Same NAT-based 
Network for both the Legitimate Clients and the Attackers  
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5.4.6 False Negative 
 
Figure 58 shows the number of malicious requests attempting to access the cloud services 
per second, and at what point in time the EDoS Attack Defense Shell (EDoS-ADS) and 
the simulation case 2 succeed in blocking these. The malicious requests are generated by 
clients in group 3, 4, and 5 with total rate of 300 requests per second. 
Once the EDoS attack begins at minute one, we can notice about 300 malicious requests 
attempting to access the cloud service for the EDoS-ADS and the simulation case 2.  It is 
noted that the EDoS-ADS succeeds in blocking the malicious requests immediately. 
However, the simulation case 2 does not block the malicious requests and the number of 
malicious requests attempting to access the cloud services per second fluctuates around 
300 Req/sec. 
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Figure 58 False Negative Evaluation in the Attack Mode with the Use of the Same NAT-based Network for both 
the Legitimate Clients and the Attackers 
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6 CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This chapter summarizes the major contribution and findings in this thesis. The main 
objective of this research is to design and implement a mitigation technique capable of 
preventing or mitigating the impact of the Economic Denial of Suitability (EDoS) attack 
on the cloud computing environment. In addition, this chapter states the limitations of the 
proposed work with possible improvements as future work. 
 
6.1 Conclusion 
 
Cloud computing is a promising technology. However, the security of cloud computing 
must be investigated deeply. The EDoS attack is one of the major threats targeted 
towards the cloud computing environments. Thus, it needs to be considered. In this 
thesis, a novel solution is presented to mitigate or prevent such attacks. The mitigation 
technique, namely EDoS Attack Defense Shell (EDoS-ADS), is based on reactive 
mitigation schemes. It is only triggered when there is suspicious traffic coming to the 
cloud platform. Therefore, all incoming traffic is directed to the EDoS-ADS for 
investigating and evaluating the legitimacy of the requests.  
Through the proposed technique, limited access permission for cloud services is granted 
to each user based on different factors such as reCAPTCHA Turing test, Uniform 
Resource Locator (URL) redirection technique, Trust Factor (TF), and Maximum 
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Requests Per Second (MRPS). Initially, the proposed technique will monitor the auto 
scaling feature and the auto scaling thresholds to detect if there is an EDoS attack. Once 
an attack behavior is detected, the cloud service will trigger a checking component for 
differentiating between legitimate users and automated attackers. Subsequently, the 
requests generated by an automated attacker will be dropped while the legitimate users’ 
requests will be directed to the cloud servers. The proposed approach has the ability to 
identify the legitimacy of clients behind a Network Address Translation (NAT) router 
and avoid blocking an entire NAT-based network that may hosts legitimate clients from 
accessing the cloud servers. The effectiveness of the proposed mitigation technique is 
evaluated using CloudSim simulator. 
In addition, we compared our proposed mitigation technique with the EDoS-Shield in 
three cases; the optimal case, the whitelist case, and the blacklist case. The comparison 
results have shown that our proposed mitigation technique is better than the EDoS-Shield 
in all of the considered cases in terms of performance metrics. In the whitelist case, the 
EDoS-Shield could still allow some attackers to launch the EDoS attack. In the blacklist 
case, the EDoS-Shield may unknowingly block a NAT IP address that corresponds to 
thousands of legitimate users due to the misbehaving of one attacker that belongs to the 
same NAT-based network. Overall, the proposed mitigation technique has shown 
promising results. The performance measures have shown the effectiveness of our 
proposed mitigation technique. 
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6.2 Future Work 
 
The future work improvements will look into the following aspects: 
1. One of the future directions for this work is to conduct an experimental 
implementation of the proposed mitigation technique using a test bed of a private 
or a public cloud and compare the obtained results with the simulation results. 
2. To enhance the simulation, we could add different distributions of the attacks and 
consider different types of attacks other than the DDoS attacks that could lead to 
the EDoS attack. 
3. Using a smarter method to detect if the attack has finished rather than using the 
Attack Timer that depends on the Attack Period Time (APT). 
4. The cloud customers could be charged to some degree especially when the DDoS 
attack does not trigger the proposed mitigation techniques due to not exceeding 
the pre-defined thresholds, Low Rate EDoS (LR-EDoS) attack. So, the proposed 
mitigation technique needs to be improved in order to detect the LR-EDoS attack.  
5. We have assumed that the attacker is incapable to solve the reCAPTCHA Turing 
tests and perform the URL redirection. One of the future directions for this work 
is to run some scenarios where the attackers are capable to solve some the Turing 
tests and/or able to perform the URL redirection to confirm if the EDoS Attack 
Defense Shell will take care of such a scenario or whether it needs further 
improvement. 
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APPENDIX A: RESOURCES UTILIZATION AND NUMBER 
OF ALLOCATED VM INSTANCES IN THE FLASH 
OVERCROWD MODE 
The resources utilization and the number of allocated VM instances for the simulation 
case 2 at rates of 0.4, 0.8, 1.6, 2.4, and 3.2 KReq/sec are shown in Figure 59, Figure 61, 
Figure 63, Figure 65, and Figure 67, respectively. In addition, the resources utilization 
and the number of allocated VM instances for the EDoS Attack Defense Shell (EDoS-
ADS) at rates of 0.4, 0.8, 1.6, 2.4, and 3.2 KReq/sec are shown in Figure 60, Figure 62, 
Figure 64, Figure 66, and Figure 68, respectively. 
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Figure 59 Resources Utilization Evaluation and the Number of Allocated VM Instances for the Simulation with 
Auto Scaling but Without Mitigation Technique (Simulation Case 2) at Rate of 0.4 KReq/sec in the Flash 
Overcrowd Mode 
145 
 
 
Figure 60 Resources Utilization Evaluation and the Number of Allocated VM Instances for EDoS Attack 
Defense Shell Simulation at Rate of 0.4 KReq/sec in the Flash Overcrowd Mode 
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Figure 61 Resources Utilization Evaluation and the Number of Allocated VM Instances for the Simulation With 
Auto Scaling but Without Mitigation Technique (Simulation Case 2) at Rate of 0.8 KReq/sec in the Flash 
Overcrowd Mode 
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Figure 62 Resources Utilization Evaluation and the Number of Allocated VM Instances for EDoS Attack 
Defense Shell Simulation at Rate of 0.8 KReq/sec in the Flash Overcrowd Mode 
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Figure 63 Resources Utilization Evaluation and the Number of Allocated VM Instances for the Simulation With 
Auto Scaling but Without Mitigation Technique (Simulation Case 2) at Rate of 1.6 KReq/sec in the Flash 
Overcrowd Mode 
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Figure 64 Resources Utilization Evaluation and the Number of Allocated VM Instances for EDoS Attack 
Defense Shell Simulation at Rate of 1.6 KReq/sec in the Flash Overcrowd Mode 
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Figure 65 Resources Utilization Evaluation and the Number of Allocated VM Instances for the Simulation With 
Auto Scaling but Without Mitigation Technique (Simulation Case 2) at Rate of 2.4 KReq/sec in the Flash 
Overcrowd Mode 
151 
 
 
Figure 66 Resources Utilization Evaluation and the Number of Allocated VM Instances for EDoS Attack 
Defense Shell Simulation at Rate of 2.4 KReq/sec in the Flash Overcrowd Mode 
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Figure 67 Resources Utilization Evaluation and the Number of Allocated VM Instances for the Simulation With 
Auto Scaling but Without Mitigation Technique (Simulation Case 2) at Rate of 3.2 KReq/sec in the Flash 
Overcrowd Mode 
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Figure 68 Resources Utilization Evaluation and the Number of Allocated VM Instances for EDoS Attack 
Defense Shell Simulation at Rate of 3.2 KReq/sec in the Flash Overcrowd Mode 
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APPENDIX B: RESPONSE TIME EVALUATION IN THE 
FLASH OVERCROWD MODE 
The time average end-to-end response time evaluation for the simulation case 2 at rates of 
0.4, 0.8, 1.6, 2.4, and 3.2 KReq/sec is shown in Figure 69, Figure 71, Figure 73, Figure 
75, and Figure 77, respectively. In addition, the time average end-to-end response time 
evaluation for the EDoS Attack Defense Shell (EDoS-ADS) at rates of 0.4, 0.8, 1.6, 2.4, 
and 3.2 KReq/sec is shown in Figure 70, Figure 72, Figure 74, Figure 76, and Figure 78, 
respectively.  
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Figure 69 Response Time Evaluation for Simulation With Auto Scaling but Without Mitigation Technique 
(Simulation Case 2) at Rate of 0.4 KReq/sec in the Flash Overcrowd Mode 
 
Figure 70 Response Time Evaluation for EDoS Attack Defense Shell Simulation at Rate of 0.4 KReq/sec in the 
Flash Overcrowd Mode 
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Figure 71 Response Time Evaluation for Simulation With Auto Scaling but Without Mitigation Technique 
(Simulation Case 2) at Rate of 0.8 KReq/sec in the Flash Overcrowd Mode 
 
Figure 72 Response Time Evaluation for EDoS Attack Defense Shell Simulation at Rate of 0.8 KReq/sec in the 
Flash Overcrowd Mode 
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Figure 73 Response Time Evaluation for Simulation With Auto Scaling but Without Mitigation Technique 
(Simulation Case 2) at Rate of 1.6 KReq/sec in the Flash Overcrowd Mode 
 
Figure 74 Response Time Evaluation for EDoS Attack Defense Shell Simulation at Rate of 1.6 KReq/sec in the 
Flash Overcrowd Mode 
158 
 
 
Figure 75 Response Time Evaluation for Simulation With Auto Scaling but Without Mitigation Technique 
(Simulation Case 2) at Rate of 2.4 KReq/sec in the Flash Overcrowd Mode 
 
Figure 76 Response Time Evaluation for EDoS Attack Defense Shell Simulation at Rate of 2.4 KReq/sec in the 
Flash Overcrowd Mode 
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Figure 77 Response Time Evaluation for Simulation With Auto Scaling but Without Mitigation Technique 
(Simulation Case 2) at Rate of 3.2 KReq/sec in the Flash Overcrowd Mode 
 
Figure 78 Response Time Evaluation for EDoS Attack Defense Shell Simulation at Rate of 3.2 KReq/sec in the 
Flash Overcrowd Mode 
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APPENDIX C: THROUGHPUT EVALUATION IN THE 
FLASH OVERCROWD MODE 
The throughput evaluation for the simulation case 2 at rates of 0.4, 0.8, 1.6, 2.4, and 3.2 
KReq/sec is shown in Figure 79, Figure 81, Figure 83, Figure 85, and Figure 87, 
respectively. In addition, the throughput evaluation for the EDoS Attack Defense Shell 
(EDoS-ADS) at rates of 0.4, 0.8, 1.6, 2.4, and 3.2 KReq/sec is shown in Figure 80, Figure 
82, Figure 84, Figure 86, and Figure 88, respectively. 
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Figure 79 Throughput Evaluation for Simulation With Auto Scaling but Without Mitigation Technique 
(Simulation Case 2) at Rate of 0.4 KReq/sec in the Flash Overcrowd Mode 
 
Figure 80 Throughput Evaluation for EDoS Attack Defense Shell Simulation at Rate of 0.4 KReq/sec in the 
Flash Overcrowd Mode 
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Figure 81 Throughput Evaluation for Simulation With Auto Scaling but Without Mitigation Technique 
(Simulation Case 2) at Rate of 0.8 KReq/sec in the Flash Overcrowd Mode 
 
Figure 82 Throughput Evaluation for EDoS Attack Defense Shell Simulation at Rate of 0.8 KReq/sec in the 
Flash Overcrowd Mode 
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Figure 83 Throughput Evaluation for Simulation With Auto Scaling but Without Mitigation Technique 
(Simulation Case 2) at Rate of 1.6 KReq/sec in the Flash Overcrowd Mode 
 
Figure 84 Throughput Evaluation for EDoS Attack Defense Shell Simulation at Rate of 1.6 KReq/sec in the 
Flash Overcrowd Mode 
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Figure 85 Throughput Evaluation for Simulation With Auto Scaling but Without Mitigation Technique 
(Simulation Case 2) at Rate of 2.4 KReq/sec in the Flash Overcrowd Mode 
 
Figure 86 Throughput Evaluation for EDoS Attack Defense Shell Simulation at Rate of 2.4 KReq/sec in the 
Flash Overcrowd Mode 
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Figure 87 Throughput Evaluation for Simulation With Auto Scaling but Without Mitigation Technique 
(Simulation Case 2) at Rate of 3.2 KReq/sec in the Flash Overcrowd Mode 
 
Figure 88 Throughput Evaluation for EDoS Attack Defense Shell Simulation at Rate of 3.2 KReq/sec in the 
Flash Overcrowd Mode 
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